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Abstract
In this dissertation I study the role of limited commitment in dynamic models. In the
first part, I consider firms that face uncertainty shocks in a principal-agent setting
but have only limited ability to commit to long-term contracts. Limited commitment
firms expedite payments to their managers when uncertainty is high, a finding that
helps to explain the puzzling large bonuses observed during the recent financial crisis.
In the second part, I examine a dynamic investment model where firms invest in a
risky asset but cannot hedge the risk of their investment because they lack the
ability to commit to future repayments of debt. Once firms have access to exogenous
supplies of risk free assets, they may on an aggregate level invest more in the risky
asset, because risk free technology allows them to increase in wealth in equilibrium.
This result helps to explain the asset price booms in emerging countries when they
experience substantial capital outflow.
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1Introduction
Contracts are important in achieving efficient resource allocations. The effectiveness
of contracts depends on transacting parties’ ability to commit to the contractual
terms. Research usually assumes that contracts are by and large enforceable due
to the existence of a legal system. This assumption however may not always hold,
as limited ability of contractual commitment actually prevails in many transacting
relationships and in many markets. In this dissertation, I consider two cases in cor-
porate finance where contracts may not be perfectly enforced: one, a compensation
contract relationship, where firms may not be able to commit to contract termination
time because of at-will employment and firms’ freedom to liquidate. Two, firms in
emerging economies may not be able to commit to future debt repayments, because
of imperfect legal systems.
In the first chapter I study optimal dynamic compensation with limited com-
mitment to contract termination, when firms are subject to uncertainty shocks. I
analyze a continuous-time dynamic principal-agent model with private effort and
regime switching in cash flow volatility and characterize the optimal managerial
compensation and termination policy. In high volatility times, firms are forced to
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expedite payments to managers because sufficient deferred compensation is no longer
credible. At the same time, contract length shortens, that is, termination becomes
more likely. This relation between the timing of payments and expected contract
length may explain the sizeable cash bonuses observed in crises times. In contrast,
with full commitment firms defer compensation more when volatility is high.
In the second part I examine limited commitment in a dynamic investment
model in the context of global financial integration. I shows that in emerging e-
conomies where contractual commitment is imperfect, capital outflows from emerging
economies after financial integration can lead to simultaneous increases in the sav-
ings rate and in domestic asset prices. Under autarky, firms in emerging economies
invest in risky capital while facing a borrowing constraint that creates a need for
precautionary savings. Financial integration provides firms with access to foreign
risk-free assets and results in two effects: a substitution effect, whereby firms divert
some investments to foreign assets and cause capital outflows; and a wealth effect,
whereby they grow richer in equilibrium and thus demand more domestic capital.
Savings gluts and asset price booms occur when the wealth effect dominates. The
increases in savings and asset prices are inefficiently high relative to the socially op-
timal level and can be amplified by heterogeneity in productivity among domestic
firms.
2
2Dynamic Compensation and Uncertainty Shocks
Managerial compensation is among the most controversial issues brought out by the
recent financial crisis. How compensation is designed matters for providing managers
with proper incentives, especially when the outcome of managerial effort bears great
uncertainty. Because individuals are forward-looking, their valuation of compensa-
tion depends on the future payments they can expect and therefore hinges on firms’
ability to commit to making these payments. The theoretical literature on financial
contracts usually assumes that firms have perfect ability to commit, which is not
always the case in practice.
A simple example illustrates why assuming full commitment power is potentially
restrictive. In a canonical principal-agent model, pay-for-performance is used to
solve agency problems. The principal rewards the agent through payments such
as bonuses when performance measures are sufficiently strong and punishes him
usually through contract termination when performance measures are weak. In other
words, firms’ commitment is two-fold: commitment to make payments when due
and commitment to retain managers until a termination condition is triggered. The
latter type of commitment is generally infeasible in practice given the prevalence of
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at-will employment. Under US labor law, firms can fire employees without having to
establish just cause or give warning. Firms can also liquidate anytime, after which
they are no longer liable for any future compensation promised to employees.
In this chapter, I study the optimal compensation contract where firms face un-
certainty shocks but cannot credibly guarantee future payments to managers because
they can walk away from the contract at any time. I refer to this ability to unilater-
ally terminate contracts as limited commitment and explore its implications for the
dynamics of compensation, in particular crisis-time incentive payments. In the re-
cent financial crisis, managerial compensation drew wide attention from the general
public and academic researchers alike when it was revealed that huge losses of com-
pany wealth notwithstanding, many bankers and executives still received substantial
compensation. Most notable are the bonuses paid out by financial firms, for example
Merrill Lynch, which paid out a total of $3.6 billion in bonuses in the 2008 fiscal
year despite having suffered losses of $27 billion; and Citigroup, which paid out $5.3
billion in bonuses after a $27.7 billion loss1.
The controversially large compensation during the recent crisis warrants further
investigation of firms’ compensation practices in the face of uncertainty shocks. Un-
certainty lies at the heart of financial crises, as pointed out by the growing research
showing that changes in real business outcomes are driven by changes in underlying
investment risks2. Financial firms, among other businesses, are the most sensitive to
uncertainty shocks and therefore rely heavily on incentive pay, which makes up the
majority of overall firm cost as well as total employee compensation. Incentive pay,
however, is not determined by uncertainty alone. It also depends on firms’ ability to
1 Wall Street Journal: Wall Street Compensation–‘No Clear Rhyme or Reason’. July 30th, 2009.
More detailed statistics can be found in the press release of the New York State Comptroller (2009)
as well as in Frydman and Jenter (2010) and Kaplan (2012)
2 See for instance Bloom (2009), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012), Atkeson, Eisfeldt, and Weill
(2013), Di Tella (2013), He and Krishnamurthy (2013a)
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commit to making the promised incentive payments. Moreover, limited commitment
is more of an issue during crisis times when uncertainty is high, since firm liquidation
and managerial turnover are more frequent and concern over firms’ ability to abide
by their commitments is greater.
I argue that large incentive pay in high uncertainty crisis times can result from
optimal compensation contracts, under limited commitment. The engine of anal-
ysis is a continuous time principal-agent model in which the agent, representing a
manager, can choose an effort level that is unobservable to the principal. Given this
potential for moral hazard, the principal’s optimal contract requires that the firm
incentivize the manager by promising future payments that depend on performance.
These payments are made in the form of cash bonuses after managers exceed a cer-
tain performance benchmark. However, when firm value is low and promised future
payment to managers high, firms with only limited power of commitment will be
tempted to terminate managers’ contracts, thereby avoiding all future obligations.
Faced with the possibility of losing future compensation, managers will not agree
to a prolonged delay of payments. This relationship between payment timing and
contract length leads firms to compensate their managers more immediately in order
to maintain proper incentives.
I model uncertainty shocks through stochastic regime switching between low and
high volatility states, representing normal and crisis times. Under regime switching,
firms optimally allocate managerial deferred compensation until the marginal value
before the uncertainty shock is equal to the marginal value after the shock. These
important dynamics are absent from simple comparative statics, which implicitly
hold managerial deferred compensation constant when comparing different volatility
levels. However, the capacity to defer compensation is constrained by how much
future payment firms can credibly pledge. Without the ability to commit to the
timing of contract termination, firms are forced to substitute future payments with
5
immediate payments whenever firm value is low and termination more likely, resulting
in more cash bonuses being paid once the crisis state obtains. These payments
should not be confused with a “reward.” In fact, the lifetime present value managers
derive from a contract that results in more immediate payments during crises is
lower. This is because managers are simultaneously subject to a higher probability
of termination. In contrast, firms with full commitment defer compensation more
when volatility is high, and managers may be consequently rewarded with a higher
present value of total compensation. These predictions are generally in line with
empirical evidence such as Peters and Wagner (2013), who show that increases of
market volatility lead to more forced managerial turnover, which in turn result in
higher managerial compensation.
Despite many studies on managerial compensation, direct analysis of why com-
pensation (in particular the bonuses paid by financial firms) during crisis time re-
mains high is rare. Several theories attempt to rationalize the escalating use of
incentive compensation and high-powered contracts for financial firms with firms’
competition for managerial talent. Glode, Green, and Lowery (2012) build a model
where firms over-invest in financial experts to gain strategic advantage in subsequent
trading. Axelson and Bond (2012) introduce large compensation for employees of
financial firms through the size of capital they manage and argue why competition
among employees does not depress compensation. Be´nabou and Tirole (2013) model
how competition for productive managers interacts with firms’ incentive structure
through a multitasking and screening model and explore the consequences of regula-
tory policies such as bonus caps, a feature also discussed in Bijlsma, Boone, and Zwart
(2012), Thanassoulis (2012), Bond and Glode (2013), Glode and Lowery (2013).
While explaining the unusually and increasingly high compensation earned by the
employees of the financial sector, these existing theories do not answer whether and
why such compensation remains high when market fundamentals deteriorate. Their
6
argument also relies on the heterogeneity and scarcity of talent in the financial in-
dustry, which is more applicable to senior executives and CEOs. However, empirical
evidence from Oyer (2008), Kaplan and Rauh (2010), Philippon and Reshef (2012).
show that high level incentive payments extend beyond a handful of top managerial
elites, who are arguably more skillful and can earn a larger premium. In contrast,
agents in my model are homogenous and large payments in the form of cash bonuses
are still possible even if the market is highly volatile because firms choose the level of
immediate compensation optimally depending on their credibility to promise future
payments.
This chapter makes several contributions to the literature of contract theory,
managerial compensation, and corporate governance. On the modeling side, to my
knowledge, this is the first paper that jointly considers agency, limited commitment,
and regime switching. It is also one of the first to examine the relationship between
compensation and volatility, whereas most of the extant research on managerial com-
pensation has so far focused on profitability3. Meanwhile, this chapters theoretical
results generate testable empirical hypotheses: conditional on negative uncertainty
shocks, commitment-constrained firms make larger immediate payments and have
higher managerial turnover relative to unconstrained firms. These hypotheses have
implications for the understanding and evaluation of firms’ governance. While the
empirical literature on corporate governance generally takes low total compensation
and high pay-for-performance sensitivity as indicative of good governance, this chap-
ter shows the importance of considering the level and structure of compensation un-
der the context of market uncertainty. Total compensation and pay-for-performance
sensitivity are sensible proxies for firm governance only when firms have no commit-
3 Except for studies on the sensitivity of pay-for-performance, such Lambert and Larcker (1987),
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), and Core and Guay (2002). See Prendergast (2002) for a survey
on this topic. These studies usually do not focus on the correlation between volatility and the the
level of pay itself
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ment issue, which may not always be true, especially during spells of high volatility.
Results of this chapter put forth a caveat to the popular perception that the
high compensation observed in the recent financial crisis is a sign that managers
are entrenched and the current compensation structure largely suboptimal (or even
corrupt). This public notion has motivated political activism to regulate and reform
compensation practices4. However, without taking into account firms’ commitment
ability, policies intended to align managers’ incentives with those of investors could
actually backfire. For instance, TARP recommends deferring compensation to ex-
ecutives and the Dodd-Frank Act gives shareholders the right to disapprove any
golden-parachute compensation to executives. However, executives’ valuation of de-
ferred compensation depends crucially on their assessment of firms’ ability to commit
to making future payments. With escalating uncertainty it is difficult for firms to
maintain managers’ confidence, so they must be paid with more immediacy. Thus,
during times of crisis, following the recommendation to defer compensation and re-
strict retention payments would actually do more harm than good by undermining
managerial incentives.
Using a novel approach, I also provide a justification for the limited commitment
constraint based on the security implementation of optimal contracts. The imple-
mentation involves standard securities such as equity and debt and hence potential
tension between their holders. Following an uncertainty increase, the face value of
long-term debt must decline, implying the redemption of debt which entails a wealth
transfer from equity holders. Under high volatility, firm value is low, in which case
equity holders may find it optimal to default rather than recall the debt. Therefore,
in the implementation of the contract, assuming that the principal has full ability
to commit to the agent is equivalent to assuming that equity holders have full abil-
4 See, for instance, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP): Executive Compensation Rules
& Guidance and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
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ity to commit to maintaining a certain capital structure. The latter assumption is
largely unrealistic as equity holders usually can default on debt without considering
the effect on the firm as a whole.
Finally, this model also reveals the possibility that different levels of effort from
the agent could be implemented by the optimal contract under different levels of
cash flow uncertainty. As uncertainty increases, the value of an incentive compatible
contract decreases. When the uncertainty shock is bad enough, the optimal contract
can shift from being incentive compatible to one that allows shirking. The agent stops
receiving cash payments and is instead compensated through his private benefit from
shirking, and due to lower managerial effort, expected cash flow falls. Thus, if a crisis
is substantially severe, managers will stop receiving bonuses. This, however, should
be of little comfort because it implies managerial indifference and correspondingly low
productivity. This finding also suggests the potential edogeneity between profitability
and volatility, which challenges empirical studies on executive compensation that
treat the two as independent.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 briefly reviews
the related literature. Section 2.2 describes the main model with fixed uncertainty
level and solves for the optimal contract under limited commitment. Section 2.3
introduces uncertainty shocks and derives the model’s implications on dynamic com-
pensation. Section 2.4 discusses two major extensions: security implementation and
shirking in equilibrium. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.1 Related Literature
This chapter builds on the rich line of literature regarding optimal compensation in
dynamic environments. Early work on dynamic agency problems such as Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1987), Spear and Srivastava (1987) points out that moral hazard calls
for the principal to delay payments to the agent until some measure of performance is
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observed. The agent’s continuation value, which is the net present value of all future
income he expects to receive from the contract, is a powerful tool that can be used
to characterize the optimal recursive contract. In more recent years the development
of stochastic dynamic control has lead to the rise of continuous time agency models
which, compared to their discrete time counterparts, yield highly tractable solutions.
Sannikov (2008) derives the seminal martingale method for continuous time dynamic
agency models. Since then the method has been applied to models with different
cash flow processes, such as arithmetic Brownian motion in DeMarzo and Sannikov
(2006), geometric Brownian motion in He (2009), and point processes in Biais et al.
(2010).
In this chapter, the cash flow process and the moral hazard problem are adopted
from DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), where a manager with private effort contracts
with a principal who has a project yielding continuous cash flows with increments
following an arithmetic Brownian motion. The manager in DeMarzo and Sannikov
(2006) is protected by limited liability, while the principal has full commitment power.
The incentive compatible contract requires that the manager is not paid until his
present value from the contract exceeds a payment boundary chosen optimally by
the principal according to the state of the economy. During crisis times when cash
flow uncertainty soars, the optimal contract with full commitment would postpone
the payment boundary even farther and the manager would be less likely to receive
cash payments in any given period. Such a prediction does not square with the
sizable bonuses paid by many distressed financial firms in the recent crisis. This
observation motivates relaxation of the strong assumption of full commitment power
by the principal.
Indeed, one of the two key assumptions at the heart of this chapter is the prin-
cipal’s lack of commitment to future payments. This assumption alone has been
explored in prior work: Thomas and Worrall (1988, 1994), Abreu et al. (1990) and
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Ray (2002) discuss the general methodology that solves the optimal contract through
discrete repeated games and find that the equilibrium can be characterized by two
state variables: the respective continuation values of the two contracting parties.
The key is to find the set of values of the state variables for which neither party
has the incentive to default in equilibrium or, commonly in the literature, for which
the contract is self-enforcing. Recent studies of Grochulski and Zhang (2011), Miao
and Zhang (2013), and Ai and Li (2013) develop the continuous time version of such
self-enforcing contracts, where a risk-averse manager runs a project with random
cash flows and must hedge his exposure to the cash flow risk with a principal who
can be risk averse or risk neutral. These studies provide some technical methodology
from which this chapter is adapted. Compared to the discrete time repeated games,
which generally involve multiple equilibria, continuous time cash flow models usually
produce an unique optimal contract5.
This chapter differs from the aforementioned studies involving limited commit-
ment in a number of dimensions. Most importantly, The majority of the limited
commitment literature focuses on the optimal risk sharing contract between a risk-
neutral principal and a risk-averse agent. In such environments , termination is never
part of an optimal compensation scheme. By contrast, I study a setting with a risk-
neutral agent who is protected by limited liability. In this environment, incentives
are optimally provided in part through threat of contract termination. This is a crit-
ical feature for my study given the high frequency of managerial turnover in times
of crisis. Assuming risk neutrality and constant outside options also greatly lowers
the technical hurdles for solving the optimal contract.
In addition to the analysis of compensation contracts, both agency and limited
5 One implicit difference between the two frameworks is the timing of the players’ actions. Under
the former framework, players usually move simultaneously. In the latter models, the principal
makes payment decisions after observing the cash flow signal, which avoids the coordination prob-
lems that arise from a repeated game with simultaneous actions.
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commitment have been widely applied to a broad range of other topics in finance.
For instance, agency based dynamic models serve as a convenient tool for analyzing
firm financing, investment, and capital structure, most notably by Albuquerque and
Hopenhayn (2004), Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007),
Rampini and Viswanathan (2013a). Likewise, limited commitment has been applied
extensively to areas in, for example, macro and international economics6. In Section
5 I explore explicitly the capital structure implied by implementing the optimal
contract with common securities. I show that the implementation assumes implicitly
that shareholders can commit to a certain capital structure, which is widely known
to be implausible. This equivalence serves as evidence that contracts with limited
commitment are potentially more prevalent than previously thought.
Several studies attempt to integrate agency problems into the limited commit-
ment framework, such as Atkeson (1991) and Levin (2003) in discrete time and more
recently Fong and Li (2012), Grochulski and Zhang (2013), and Opp and Zhu (2013)
in continuous time. The structure in Levin (2003) has become wildly known as the
relational contract. My paper differs from relational contracts in that I allow a one-
time contract termination, which can be naturally considered as firm liquidation, as
the only way in which the principal cannot credibly commit. Conditional on a firm
remaining in operation, the principal can commit to all the payments specified in the
contract. This allows long-term contracts as a viable means of overcoming agency
problems despite the imperfect enforcement condition. Furthermore, most of the ex-
isting models are set in a stationary environment. As described in the introduction,
a stationary environment is insufficient for characterizing the dynamics of compen-
sation when the state of the economy shifts, as firms will adjust their compensation
in a state-contingent manner to optimally allocate the value of compensation. In
6 To name a few, Bulow and Rogoff (1989), Kehoe and Levine (1993), Alvarez and Jermann (2000),
Kehoe and Perri (2002), Cooley et al. (2004)
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contrast to the existing literature, my model involves regime switching and therefore
provides stronger implications for the dynamics of compensation during crisis versus
normal times.
This regime switching technique for continuous time models is adopted from
Hoffmann and Pfeil (2010), Piskorski and Tchistyi (2010), Bolton, Chen, and Wang
(2013), DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang (2012). My paper is closely related to
Hoffmann and Pfeil (2010), which also adopts the DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006)
framework with private effort and an arithmetic Brownian motion cash flow pro-
cess. This paper differs from the others which focus mainly on stochastic regimes
of profitability by considering regimes of cash flow volatility. Although the key re-
sults are generally replicable with stochastic profitability, volatility is more suitable
for analyzing the compensation of financial firms which predominantly consists of
contingent incentive payments rather than fixed salary payments.
To my best knowledge, this paper is the first to combine moral hazard and limited
commitment with regime switching in a continuous time framework. This innova-
tion allows me to rationalize several important crisis time observations regarding
managerial compensation that have largely escaped understanding before now.
2.2 Model
In this section I describe the model in a standard principal-agent environment with
only one regime of uncertainty. I first solve the optimal contract assuming that the
principal has full commitment power. After discussing the limitation of this strong
assumption, I then solve the optimal contract but suppose limited commitment by
the principal.
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2.2.1 Basic Environment
Time is continuous. A principal, representing a firm, must hire an agent, representing
a manager, to run a project. Both the principal and the agent are risk neutral. The
cash flow Yt of the project follows
dYt “ µpetqdt` σdZt ,
where Zt is a standard Brownian motion; µpetq is the expected growth rate of cash
flow depending on the agent’s effort. σ is the cash flow volatility, which measures
the level of uncertainty a firm faces when taking on such a project.
The agent controls the cash flow growth rate by choosing a binary effort level
et P te, eu, representing “working” and “shirking”, respectively. I assume µpeq “ µ
and µpeq “ µ´C where C ą 0, that is, shirking results in lower expected cash flow.
However, the agent enjoys a private benefit λC whenever he shirks, where λ P p0, 1s
measures the degree of agency problem in this model. Effort is private to the agent:
the principal can observe Yt but not et. The principal discounts future cash flows by
r and the agent by γ ą r, so the agent is more impatient.7
For now, I assume that the principal can commit to any contract once it is signed,
but the agent is protected by limited liability with an outside option whose value
R is normalized to 0. Limited liability implies that payments to the agent must
be non-negative and that contract termination is necessary for incentive provision.
The principal has an outside option L which she receives whenever the contract is
terminated. Both the principal and the agent take no further action after the con-
tract termination, which eliminates reputation concerns. One can interpret contract
7 The asymmetry of discount rates is essential for a non-trivial incentive compatible contract to
exist in this type of model. Because of the agent’s private effort, the principal must delay cash
payments to the agent until his cumulative performance exceeds a certain threshold. Having the
agent discount future cash income heavier ensures that providing incentive through such delaying
is costly for the principal so the principal will not want to delay payments forever. However, once
I impose the principal’s commitment constraint, this additional constraint leads to the existence of
an optimal contract even for the case where r=γ, which I describe in Section 4
14
termination here as a firm’s liquidation and exit from the market permanently or,
equivalently, as a firm’s replacement of managers, where L is the normalized net
profit from contracting with a new manager.
I also assume for most part of this chapter that the principal prefers to induce
the agent to work. This is true as long as C, the cost of shirking, is high enough.
In Section 5 I discuss how sufficiently large uncertainty shocks can allow shirking in
equilibrium because incentive provision is too costly when uncertainty is high.
Let Ft be the filtration generated by the cash flow history. A contract which
specifies a compensation process tItutě0 from the principal to the agent, a termination
time τ , and a recommended effort process et defines the agent’s continuation utility
Wt:
Wt “ E
„ż τ
t
e´γps´tq
`
dIs ` λC1tet“eudt
˘ |Ft .
where 1tet“eu is an indicator function that takes value 1 if et “ e and zero other wise.
Wt simply measures the present value of all expected future payments and can be
intuitively interpreted as the agent’s “wealth”. Similarly, the contract defines the
principal’s valuation of the project Vt which is the expectation of total future cash
flow minus the payment to the agent plus the liquidation value when the contract is
terminated.
Vt “ E
„ż τ
t
e´rps´tq pdYt ´ dIsq ` e´rpτ´tqL|Ft

,
So far the basic environment is identical to the one in DeMarzo and Sannikov
(2006). I therefore briefly review their solution for the optimal contract to offer a
benchmark for later comparison. Using the martingale method developed by San-
nikov (2008), there exists Ft measurable processes βt such that Wt evolves according
to
dWt ` dIt “ γWt ´ λC1tet“eudt` βtpdYt ´ pµ´ C1tet“euqdtq . (2.1)
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Equation (2.1) means the principal can compensate the agent with either imme-
diate payments dI or future payments dW . Payments are sensitive to the agent’s
performance, i.e. the realized cash flows dYt, and the sensitivity is measured by βt.
DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) shows that the contract is incentive compatible if and
only if βt ě λ for all t ă τ . Intuitively, βt represents the agent’s “skin in the game”
in the incentive compatible contract or the sensitivity of the agent’s continuation
utility to the realized cash flow. The sensitivity must be no less than λ which is the
amount of private benefit the agent can derive per unit of cash flow he looses from
shirking.
Under the optimal incentive compatible contract the principal’s valuation of the
project Vt is a function of the agent’s continuation utility Wt. The function is denoted
as V pWtq and is referred to as firm value, since the principal represents a firm in this
contracting relationship. The principal must earn an instantaneous return r under
the optimal contract through the expected cash flow and the expected change rate
of her valuation of the project, that is
V pWtq “ E rdYt ` dV pWtqs . (2.2)
Applying Ito’s lemma to (2.2) and imposing et “ e on equation (2.1), V pWtq is
characterized by the following Hamiltonian-Jacobian-Bellman (HJB) equation:
rV pWtq “ max
βtěλ
µ` γWtV 1pWtq ` 1
2
β2t σ
2V 2pWtq . (2.3)
The principal maximizes her HJB equation by choosing βt optimally. The con-
cavity of the value function implies βt “ λ for all t as long as the principal induces
working as the equilibrium effort. On the one hand, βt ě λ is necessary for incentive
reasons. On the other hand, it is not optimal to set β above λ since higher sensitivity
increases the likelihood of contract termination which is also a costly action for the
principal.
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The principal’s value function must also satisfy three additional conditions which
define two boundaries for Wt: the termination boundary and the payment boundary.
First, the contract is terminated when Wt hits R. The principal cannot provide
further incentives by lowering the agent’s continuation utility any more since the
agent is protected by limited liability. The principal receives the liquidation value L
at the time of contract termination, so VspRq “ L. Secondly, since the principal can
always make a lump sum transfer of dI to the agent, the principal’s valuation of the
project satisfies V pW q ě V pW´dIq´dI. Equivalently this means V 1pW q ě ´1, that
the shadow value of the agent’s continuation utility to the principal should not be
lower than the cost of an instant cash payment. Defining W “ inf tW |V 1pW q “ ´1u
as the payment boundary. W satisfies the “smooth pasting” condition V 1pW q “ ´1.
The agent will receive instant cash payment of size Wt ´W once Wt ą W , which
brings Wt back to W immediately. Finally, the payment boundary W is optimally
chosen by the principal, which implies the “super contact” condition: V 2s pW q “ 0.
The following lemma, which is also Proposition 1 in DeMarzo and Sannikov
(2006), summarizes the optimal incentive compatible contract in this setting:
Lemma 2.2.1. The optimal incentive compatible contract, which maximizes the prin-
cipal’s payoff subject to delivering value W to the agent and satisfying the agent’s
limited liability, can without loss of generality be characterized by a value function
V pW q and a payment boundary W such that
rV pW q “ µ` γWV 1pW q ` 1
2
λ2σ2V 2pW q ,
with boundary conditions V pRq “ L; V 1pW q “ ´1; V 2pW q “ 0. Immediate cash
payment of size Wt ´W is made for all Wt ą W . When Wt “ R, the contract is
terminated.
Under the optimal contract, the agent receives compensation dI “ maxpWt ´
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W, 0q, which is always non-negative because of his limited liability and strictly pos-
itive whenever his continuation utility Wt exceeds the payment boundary W . This
compensation scheme resembles cash bonuses that managers in practice receive for
good performance, where W represents the “bonus hurdle” managers must clear be-
fore getting paid. Hence, this model is suitable for studying the compensation of
financial firms, in which cash bonuses make up the bulk of total employee compen-
sation. Note that Lemma 2.2.1 concludes that any optimal incentive compatible
contract can without loss of generality be characterized by a contract involving in-
centive pay that resembles cash bonuses, a natural means of incentive provision in
this setting. Thus, in the remainder of this chapter, I refer to the cash payment
dI as bonuses. Keep in mind that it is representative of incentive pay in general,
which in the current model can be contracted on and hence to which the principal
can commit.
The optimal contract is associated with welfare losses due to moral hazard. The
efficient allocation calls for the principal and the agent to split the maximal surplus
generated by running the project permanently; that is, the agent’s compensation and
the principal’s payoff satisfy V pW q `W “ µ{r, which marks the Pareto frontier of
this model in the absence of moral hazard. However, when moral hazard is present,
the principal must design incentive compatible contracts featuring delayed payments
to the agent. Substituting boundary conditions V 1pW q “ ´1 and V 2pW q “ 0 into the
principal’s HJB equation yields rV pW q`γW “ µ, which is the “second best” frontier
below the Pareto efficient frontier. This is because the agent is more impatient
and some surplus is lost in the optimal incentive compatible contract with delayed
payment. The “second best” frontier becomes a critical boundary when considering
the optimal contract with principal’s limited commitment, which is introduced in
the following subsection.
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2.2.2 The Commitment Constraint
So far, the structure of the optimal contract characterized in Lemma 2.2.1 relies
on the principal’s commitment to all future payments once the contract is signed.
However, before the agent’s continuation utility W hits the payment boundary W ,
the agent is not actually paid. His continuation utility measures the present value of
the total amount of payment he expects to receive in the future, only if the principal
honors the contract. Just as the agent is tempted to quit his job when W approaches
his reservation utility R, the principal will likewise be tempted to exercise her outside
option, which in this model is liquidating the project and receiving L, if the firm
value V drops below the liquidation value before W reaches the payment boundary.
If enforcement is not perfect and commitment becomes a binding constraint before
the cash payment boundary is reached, the dynamics of the optimal contract will
consequently be different.
To consider this impact, I assume that the principal can terminate the agent’s
contract anytime. As discussed earlier, this assumption of limited commitment on the
part of the principal is more realistic, as firms generally are free to fire managers or
liquidate projects at any time in practice. Once the contract is terminated, I assume
both parties will receive the value of their outside options: L for the principal and
R for the agent. This assumption sets this model apart from the other models in
the relational contract literature in that termination time is the only aspect of the
contract to which the principal cannot commit. Conditional on the continuation
of the contract, the principal can still commit to all payments once the payment
boundary is reached, suggesting the existence of long-term contracts although subject
to a participation constraint from the principal8.
8 At this point the principal can also commit not to renegotiate the contract, even though rene-
gotiation can be mutually beneficial. I discuss the renegotiation-proof contract under this setting
in the Appendix
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The assumption that both the principal and agent receive constant outside value
whenever the contract is terminated is critical to obtaining a close-form solution.
Existing models of limited commitment usually consider endogenous outside options,
and common dynamic programming techniques usually do not apply directly. In
my model the constant outside option assumption greatly simplifies the analysis by
allowing the application of the Sannikov (2008) method to solve the moral hazard
problem. Moreover, since the cash flow in this model follows an arithmetic Brownian
motion, constant outside option value rules out strategic control of effort choices or
firm size whenever the participation constraints are binding or close to binding.
I introduce here a heuristic approach that derives the optimal contract under
principal’s limited commitment by separating the commitment constraint from moral
hazard, the other contractual friction in the model. First, suppose the agent’s effort
is observable to the principal and then the only contractual constraints are the prin-
cipal’s limited commitment and the agent’s limited liability. Limited commitment
implies a participation constraint for the principal:
Vt ě L . (2.4)
Combined with the agent’s participation constraint Wt ě R, they define a payoff
space tpW,V q|W ě R, V ě Lu where, if the continuation value delivered by a con-
tract falls into the space, the contract will not be terminated, i.e. the contract is
self-enforcing.
Given the self-enforcing contracting space, consider now adding moral hazard.
The martingale representation theorem implies the dynamics of W still follows equa-
tion (2.1), and the optimal contract still features a reflecting payment boundary W .
Combined with the principal and agent’s participation constraints, these conditions
define a space between W ě R, V ě L and the “second best” frontier rV ` γW “ µ
in which the optimal contract value function must lie. The principal’s valuation of
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the project V is a function V pW q of the agent’s continuation utility, where V pW q
satisfies the same HJB in equation (2.3).
The exact shape of the value function is pinned down by appropriate bound-
ary conditions similar to those characterized in Lemma 2.2.1. Intuitively, at the
termination boundary, firm value must match the liquidation value L. At the pay-
ment boundary, the marginal value of cash payment always equals the shadow val-
ue of the agent’s continuation utility. This implies the “smooth-pasting” condition
V 1pW q “ ´1 always holds. The last boundary condition depends on whether the val-
ue function crosses the “second best” frontier rV pW q`γW “ µ or the self-enforcing
border V pW q “ L first. If the value function meets rV pW q ` γW “ µ first, it
immediately follows V 2pW q “ 0 and the principal’s commitment constraint is not
binding. In contrast, if the value function reaches V pW q “ L first, then V pW q “ L
is the boundary condition that replaces V 2pW q “ 0.
These boundary conditions are intuitive. By concavity of the value functions, if
the payment boundary is such that both the limited commitment constraint and the
“super contact” condition are slack, in other words V pW q ą L and V 2pW q ă 0, the
principal can always achieve a higher value by postponing the payment further, until
either condition becomes binding. If the commitment constraint is binding with
a lower W , the payment boundary is no longer optimally chosen, and the “super
contact” condition is replaced with a physical boundary condition V pW q “ L. The
reason why only firm value at the payment boundary turns out to matter under
limited commitment is the combination of a concave value function, V pRq “ L on
the left boundary, and W as a reflecting right boundary.
Let variables with a superscript L represent variables in the limited commitment
environment, the following proposition summarizes the optimal contract. A formal
verification theorem of the optimality of this contract is provided in the appendix.
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Proposition 2.2.1. The optimal contract under the principal’s limited commitment
constraint is characterized by a value function V LpW q and a payment boundary WL,
such that
rV LpW q “ µ` γWV L1pW q ` 1
2
λ2σ2V L2pW q ,
subject to boundary conditions V LpRq “ L; V L1pWLq “ ´1; and
V L2pWLq “ 0, if V LpWLq ě L ,
V LpWLq “ L, otherwise.
As in the full commitment benchmark case, the principal’s value functions V LpW q
under limited commitment is also a concave function with an interior maximal point.
The principal’s commitment constraint becomes binding when W is high, in other
words when the manager has accumulated adequate performance history. This is
not counter-intuitive as W is a measure of the amount of future bonuses managers
are owed, a form of debt of the firm induced by the labor contract. Higher debt in
the form of bonuses lowers the share of profit investors can earn from investing in
the firm. When it becomes large enough, investors will find it optimal to default like
they would with any other form of debt. In that sense, the commitment constraint
can also be motivated as an upper bound for the operating leverage of the firm.
Several immediate implications can be made by comparing the limited commit-
ment contract and the full commitment contract. The following conclusions can be
shown straightforwardly:
Corollary 2.2.1. Under the same parameters,
W
L ď W .
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The inequality is strict whenever V pW q ă L and V LpWLq “ L. For all W P
rR,WLs,
V LpW q ď V pW q ,
W
L ´W ď W ´W .
Corollary 2.2.1 states if the principal’s participation constraint binds under the
limited commitment constraint, the principal can no longer defer cash payment to
the agent as much as she would like to under full commitment. This also implies
V L2pW q ă 0, that is, the “second best” frontier rV pW q`γW “ µ cannot be reached,
suggesting a further welfare loss associated with the limited commitment contract.
Since lower payment boundary implies higher likelihood of contract termination, the
total surplus generated by the contract is lower when the commitment constraint
binds. This provides the explanation for why firm value is always lower for any
given W under the limited commitment contract: conditional on delivering the same
utility to the agent, the continuation utility for the principal is lower due to earlier
termination. This result is not surprising given that the self-enforcing contracting
space is a strict subset of the contracting space under full commitment and V pW q
measures the highest value for the principal under any incentive compatible contract.
The third conclusion of Corollary 2.2.1 leads to some intuitive implications of
comparing limited commitment contracts with full commitment contracts. Under
the same parameter value, being closer to the payment boundary implies a higher
likelihood of reaching the boundary given a certain period of time. In other words,
compare two managers with the same level of continuation utility, the one under
the limited commitment contract is more likely to receive bonuses in a short period
of time. Meanwhile, managers under the limited commitment contract also face a
higher turnover rate, because they will not be able to build a large continuation value
as a result of the early payment. In all, whenever limited commitment is a binding
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constraint, firms’ capacity to promise future payments is correlated with firm value.
In normal times, firm value is high and compensation should be more “front-loaded”;
whereas in crisis times, firm value is low and compensation should be more “back-
loaded”. Although intuitive in light of Corollary 2.2.1, these statements are so far
only heuristic–I will establish them formally in the next section where I introduce
the mathematical concepts needed to conduct the analysis.
Assuming limited commitment actually expands the space of parameters in which
the optimal contract exists: the case when r “ γ. In the full commitment model,
r “ γ means the principal can costlessly delay payments to the agent. The payment
boundary is therefore infinity, and the optimal contract does not exist. In contrast,
the limited commitment constraint puts a physical bound on the payment boundary
such that the payment boundary is where the limited commitment constraint binds.
2.3 Optimal Compensation with Uncertainty Shocks
In this section I introduce uncertainty shocks. I allow the volatility of cash flows
to be stochastic, representing the transition between normal and crisis times, and
derive the optimal contract under both full and limited commitment. I then show
the implications of different contracts for the agent’s compensation first through
numerical examples from simulations and then with formal analytical arguments.
2.3.1 Volatility Regime Switching
The comparative statics above offer some intuition over the expected compensation
and contract length regarding different levels of uncertainty when firms cannot com-
mit to the contract termination time. While interesting, these comparative statics
alone are not sufficient to make a compelling argument for the high level of compensa-
tion observed in crisis times. In practice, firms can make state-contingent payments.
In other words, the principal can deploy the agent’s continuation utility Wt opti-
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mally across different economic regimes. Comparative statics derived by holding Wt
constant cannot capture the full dynamics of compensation in the presence of state
transition.
To characterize the transitional dynamics of compensation under uncertainty
shocks I extend the model by introducing regime switching. Specifically, I assume
there are two states of the economy: σl and σh, with σl ă σh, representing “normal”
and “crisis” times respectively. Importantly, the state s P l, h is verifiable and can
thus be contracted on. Given this assumption, the cash flow Yt of the project follows
dYt “ µpetqdt` σsdZt
If the current state is s, in any given time interval pt, t ` dtq, the transition
probability to the other state ps is pisdt. In the remainder of this chapter, I further
simplify the model by assuming that pih “ 0, so the state h is absorbing. This means
the economy starts with low volatility σl and experiences a one-time transition into
the high volatility state with probability pihdt within any time interval dt. I will
refer to this one-time change in volatility as the “uncertainty shock” to the economy.
Although this may sound restrictive, most of the analytical results do carry through
when I allow the states to be recurring, i.e. when pih ą 0. Discussion of the optimal
contract under recurring states is given in the appendix9.
Again, to offer a benchmark, assume for a moment that the principal has full
commitment power. The same martingale method used to solve the single state
optimal contract can be applied here but with the inclusion of an extra term in the
dynamics of Wt to account for the state transition. Let Nt denote the total number
9 I also assume that pil is a small number to ensure that states l and h have their proper definitions.
If pil is too large, the value function (derived later) in the low volatility state converges to the value
function in the high volatility state. To keep them sufficiently distant, pil must be small enough.
See Appendix A for more a detailed discussion.
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of state transitions before time t. The martingale representation theorem implies
dWt “ γWt´dIt´λC1tet“eudt`βtpdYt´pµ´C1tet“euqdtq`δpWtqpdNt´pitdtq (2.5)
The contract is still incentive compatible as long as βt ě λ. There are now two value
functions for the principal VspWtq, one for each state s P pl, hq, that satisfy:
rVspWtq “ max
βtěλ,δs
µ` pγWt ´ pitδspWtqqV 1s pWtq ` 12β
2
t σ
2
sV
2
s pWtq
`pis pVpspWt ` δspWtqq ´ VspWtqq . (2.6)
The principal now chooses βt and δspWtq optimally. The choice of βt remains the
same as when there is only one state since the moral hazard problem is unchanged,
that is βt “ λ is optimal for a incentive compatible contract. The variable δspWtq
denotes the discontinuous adjustment in the agent’s continuation utility at the time
of regime switching. Such adjustment exists because the shadow value of the agent’s
continuation utility is different for the principal in different states.The principal can
promise future compensation conditional on the state of the economy and substitute
immediate payments with more future payments if the value of the agent’s contin-
uation utility is higher in one state. Therefore, the choice of δspWtq is determined
by matching the first order derivatives of the principal’s value functions before and
after the regime switching, that is
V 1ps pWt ` δspWtqq “ V 1s pWtq, if W ` δs ą R , (2.7)
δspWtq “ R ´Wt, otherwise , (2.8)
In other words, the principal optimally deploys the agent’s continuation utility until
its marginal value to the principal is equalized across states. In the case where the
first order derivatives cannot be matched for any δs that keeps the agent’s continu-
ation value in the high volatility state above his reservation utility, the contract is
simply terminated.
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The optimal contract still features a termination boundaryR and payment bound-
aries W s for each state. Boundary conditions under the full commitment setting are
VspRq “ L (“value matching”), V 1s pW sq “ ´1 (“smooth pasting”), and V 2s pW sq “ 0
(“super contact”). Payment boundaries are on the “second best” frontier rV pW q `
γW “ µ for both the low and high volatility state. Numerical examples of the princi-
pal’s value functions are illustrated in Panel A of Figure C.1. This figure shows that
firm value is always lower in the high volatility state for any given level of agent’s
continuation utility except at the termination boundary, that is, VhpW q ă VlpW q for
every W ą R. Intuitively, since cash flow serves as a signal for the principal to infer
the agent’s private effort, a more noisy signal increases the likelihood of contract ter-
mination which is a necessary but costly action for the principal to provide proper
incentives. That is why the regime switching from the low to the high variance state
is referred to as a negative shock in this chapter.
When the principal has only limited commitment, an argument similar to Section
3.2 applies. The optimal contract features firm value functions V Ls pW q satisfying the
same system of ODEs and same boundary conditions except for the “super contact”
condition, which now follows the condition for the limited commitment contract
proposed in Proposition 2.2.1. Specifically, for each state, if the firm value at the
payment boundary is sufficiently high, then V L2s pWLs q “ 0 is true. Otherwise, if in
any state, firm value becomes too low when W approaches W
L
s , then the limited
commitment constraint V Ls pWLs q “ L binds in that state.
To summarize, the incentive compatible optimal contract under uncertainty shock-
s is characterized by the following proposition:
Proposition 2.3.1. The optimal contract under volatility regime switching with full
commitment defines a pair of value functions VspW q and payment boundaries Ws,
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s P tl, husuch that
rVspW q “ µ` pγW ´ pisδspW qqV 1s pW q ` 12λ
2σ2sV
2
s pW q
`pis pVpspW ` δspW qq ´ VspW qq , (2.9)
subject to boundary conditions VspRq “ L; V 1s pW sq “ ´1; and V 2s pW sq “ 0. δspW q
is determined by (2.7) and (2.8).
If the principal has only limited commitment, the optimal contract defines a pair
of value functions V Ls pW q and payment boundaries WLs , s P tl, hu, such that V Ls pW q
satisfies the same system of ODE (2.10) and boundary conditions V Ls pRq “ L;
V L1s pWLs q “ ´1, and
V L
2
s pWLs q “ 0, if V Ls pWLs q ě L ,
V Ls pWLs q “ L, otherwise .
The boundary conditions specified in Proposition 2.3.1 imply that under limited
commitment, the optimal contract takes three different forms depending on whether
the principal’s participation constraint (2.4) is binding at the payment boundary
in each state: first, if (2.4) is not binding for either s “ l or s “ h, this contract
is simply identical to the one characterized in Proposition 2.2.1. Whether or not
the principal can fully commit does not affect the contract. Secondly, the limited
commitment constraint can be binding in the high volatility state but not the low
volatility state. Third, the constraint can be binding in both states.10
Of the three types of contracts, the first type is obviously the least interesting since
it is identical to the contract with full commitment. The second type can resemble
contracts of either the first or the third type, depending on specific parameter values.
10 It is impossible for the constraint to be binding in the low volatility state but not in the high
volatility state, since firm value is always lower when volatility is higher. See Lemma A2.1 in the
Appendix for details.
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I leave the details of this type of contracts to the appendix. The third type of
contract produces the most distinct implications for the dynamics of compensation
between the full commitment and the limited commitment case. In the remainder of
this chapter, I will concentrate discussion on this type of contract. That is, unless
stated otherwise, I assume the parameter space is such that under full commitment,
VspW q ă L for both s “ l and s “ h11.
Numerical examples shown in Figure C.1 contrast contracts under different com-
mitment assumptions given this parameter space. Recall that panel A shows the
value functions for the full commitment contract. Noticing that in both states firm
value is below the liquidation value L and therefore payment boundaries in neither
state can be sustained without principal’s full commitment. Panel B shows the
value functions under the same parameters as Panel A but after imposing limited
commitment.
The most crucial difference made by imposing the limited commitment condition
is the position of the payment boundary. The following result highlights the point:
Corollary 2.3.1. If VspW q ă L and V Ls pWLq “ L for both s “ l and s “ h, then
W h ą W l; WLh ă WLl . That is, the payment boundary under high volatility is higher
for the full commitment contract but lower for the limited commitment contract.
Corollary 2 states that the principal defers payments to the agent when volatility
is high under the full commitment contract. Since the cost of providing incentives to
the agent is the possibility of early termination after sufficiently poor performance,
it is higher when volatility is higher, as rising uncertainty of cash flows increases
the likelihood of sufficiently poor performance and the subsequent early termination.
11 The exact space of parameters satisfying such condition is difficult to characterize. However, W is
larger and V pW q smaller whenever γ is closer to r, holding other parameters constant. This implies
if the principal and the agent have similar patience level, there is a potentially large parameter
space in which the limited commitment constraint will be binding in both states once it is imposed.
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The principal adjusts the contract optimally by giving the agent more financial slack.
Here financial slack, defined as W s ´ R, measures how much loss the principal is
willing to take before terminating the agent’s contract. Greater flexibility to the
agent regarding his performance lowers the possibility of costly early termination
and is thus optimal for the principal under higher volatility.
In contrast, if the principal has only limited commitment ability, payments to the
agent are expedited. Limited commitment implies that the principal’s participation
constraint V Ls pW q ě L must be satisfied at any given time. In other words, the
contract must guarantee firm value of at least L, which restricts the amount of future
cash flow generated by continuing the project that can be used as compensation to
the agent. When uncertainty becomes higher, the total value of the project is lower.
A principal lacking the ability to commit to future payments when firm value is too
low is forced to pay the agent earlier because the principal can now credibly promise
less compensation in the future. These relative positions of the payment boundaries
under each volatility state determine the timing of the cash payment to the agent,
the expected length of the contract, as well as the concavity of the principal’s value
function, all of which are essential in studying the compensation structure in the
next section.
It is worth noting that the discontinuity in the agent’s continuation utility δ has
non-trivial solutions even when the transition probability pil approaches zero, that is
when the pair of value functions VspW q converge to two independent functions with
different values of variance. The effect of pil on determining δ is small when pil is close
to zero because VspW q moves relatively little. This implies analyses of δ can be made
almost independently of pil for small pil which greatly simplifies the mathematics.
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2.3.2 Numerical Illustration
The optimal contracts under full and limited commitment differ in how the payment
boundary is determined. Their implications for compensation thus also differ, as the
agent only receives payments in the form of cash bonuses once his continuation utility
W exceeds the payment boundary. In this section I show how considering the optimal
contract under limited commitment generates conclusions about compensation that
standard contracts with full commitment cannot explain. Specifically, I argue that
the large compensation observed during the recent crisis can result from optimal
contracts under limited commitment, and that managers who receive large cash
bonuses also face a shorter expected contract length. Contract termination can be
equivalently interpreted as managerial turnover or firm liquidation in the model. I
will focus on the former interpretation when discussing the results.
I begin the analysis with numerical simulations, in order to provide a transparent
view of contract dynamics. In the simulations I segment the continuous-time model
into discrete time intervals. The economy starts with low volatility, and the agent’s
initial wealth W0 is drawn uniformly from the interval pR,W lq. I simulate N dif-
ferent paths of cash flows. Each path can be interpreted as one manager running
an independent project. I then allow the state to switch to σh following a poisson
arrival process, representing the transition into the crisis time. I calculate W for
each of the realized cash flows and, given the payment boundaries, record the timing
as well as the size of the cash bonuses. Finally, for each period before and after the
uncertainty shock, I calculate the frequency of cash payments by taking the average
number of recorded payments among all firms still surviving after the crisis.
I repeat this simulation procedure for both the full commitment and limited
commitment contract. Results are shown in Figure C.2, with N “ 5000.
Figure C.2 plots the frequency of payments in Panel A plots and the fraction of
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active projects (managers) at each given time in Panel B. Both contracts share ex-
actly the same parameter values. They differ only in whether or not the commitment
constraint is imposed, which alters their payment boundaries. I choose the parame-
ters such that once the limited commitment constraint is imposed, it will be binding
in both low and high volatility states, which most clearly manifests the implications
of limited commitment.
Two observations emerge from the frequency of cash bonuses shown in Figure C.2.
On the one hand, under the limited commitment contract, the frequency of payments
in the few periods immediately after the uncertainty shock is much higher than the
frequency under the full commitment contract and the frequency in the low volatility
state. On the other hand, payment frequency under the limited commitment contract
quickly diminishes to zero due to a higher rate of contract termination, while it is
much more persistent under the full commitment contract. These two observations
can be summarized into two theoretical predictions:
Predictions: Managers of firms with limited commitment (1) receive more cash
bonuses immediately after entering the crisis time; and (2) face a higher expected
turnover rate during the crisis time, compared to managers during normal times and
managers of firms with full commitment
Both results can be formalized using mathematical concepts in stochastic calculus
and are rigorously proven in the next subsection. Here I offer readers with a general
interest a heuristic derivation and an intuitive explanation of the mechanism behind
these results.
Frequency of cash payments can be rationalized when considered jointly with
the likelihood of contract termination. When uncertainty is higher, firms with full
commitment power optimally set higher bonus hurdles so managers are able to build
large continuation utility, reducing the likelihood of early contract termination. In
contrast, without full commitment power, large deferred payments are no longer
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credible. The higher the cash flow uncertainty, the lower the value from running the
firm and the more likely it is for firms to terminate managers’ contracts before any
bonuses are realized. Managers thus have to be compensated with bonuses early for
the increased likelihood of turnover. Put differently, during crisis when firm value
is low, firms have to make higher payments to retain their managers, who are more
worried about loosing their jobs in the near future. A similar argument applies to the
comparison between normal and crisis times for the limited commitment contract,
under which the capacity of credibly deferring payments is correlated with firm value
in each state.
It is important to clarify here that, despite the above description of immediate
payment as a result of shorter expected tenure, the two are not fruit and tree to
each other but rather two sides of the same coin. Both compensation and contract
length are endogenously determined by the dynamics of the state variable W . In
the high volatility state, the dynamics of the agent’s continuation utility are given
by dWt “ γWt ´ dIt ` λdZt. Payment dIt reduces Wt and thus increases the like-
lihood of termination. As shorter length stimulates more front-loaded contracts, a
front-loaded contract also implies more aggressive managerial replacement following
negative performance.
Both the result regarding compensation and the result regarding turnover are
supported by empirical evidence. Besides the level of compensation during the re-
cent crisis which motivates this chapter, it has also been suggested that the high
level of cash bonuses can be attributed to firm setting lower bonus hurdles12. The
prediction that managers face higher turnover rate during market downturns is also
consistent with empirical studies such as Jenter and Kanaan (2010), Kaplan and
Minton (2012), Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013). The empirical finding of significant cor-
12 See the Deloitte Directors’ Remuneration Report (2010) and related articles on The Times and
on Management Today
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relation between managerial turnover and poor market returns is puzzling, given that
market returns are beyond managers’ direct control. Note that those studies usually
focus on CEOs while this paper applies to a broader range of employees; they also
do not usually control for managerial payment in their regressions and are therefore
unable to directly test the theoretical hypotheses proposed here. Empirical work
that simultaneously studies managerial compensation and turnover during market
downturns is a potentially interesting direction for further research.
The dynamics of compensation revealed in this section also explain the variety
of contracts used in practice. If investors cannot promise to refrain from withdraw-
ing their investment when firm value drops below a certain level, managers will be
hesitant to agree to a contract with back-loaded payments, that is, a contract that
postpones most payments until satisfactory performance is reached. Notice that
here satisfactory performance does not necessarily increase investors’ valuation of
the firm, because the firm’s labor bill grows larger as well and, in the model where
V 1pWtq ă 0, better performance from the agent implies less value to the principal
because the agent is paid a higher share of the profit. The manager’s concern is
greatest precisely during crisis, when total value from the firm’s projects is the low-
est, and firms are more likely to close in the near future. This leads managers to
demand front-loaded contracts instead, where they are paid sooner rather than later
as suggested by the simulation results. On the contrary, if the the principal can fully
commit to retain managers they expect a longer tenure and may agree to postpone
their payment further to achieve a higher total payoff from the contract.
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis many economists and politicians
blamed the current managerial compensation scheme for not aligning managerial in-
centives with long-term investor benefit. Consequently, policy recommendations to
propagate the use of delayed payment as a solution to that problem were suggest-
ed. For instance, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) limits the ability of
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executives of TARP firms to cash out their restricted stock until the government is
repaid in full 13. However, the effectiveness of such recommendation hinges on the
credibility that future payment promised to the executives will be delivered at full
value. If executives believe that when firms are in distress, investors will withdraw
by selling their shares, then the value of their stock holdings is less the longer they
have to wait to cash them out. As a result executives may require even higher and
more immediate compensation at the time of distress.
I also calculate the average size of cash payments for each period before and after
the uncertainty shock, which produces a pattern almost identical to that observed in
Figure C.2. This is not surprising given that conditional on receiving payments, the
size of payments depends only on the variance σ which is a constant once the state is
fixed. Moreover, instead of drawing the agent’s initial utility randomly and uniformly
from pR,W lq, I also conduct similar simulations but fix the manager’s initial utility to
be Wl˚ ” arg maxW VlpW q, which is the optimal level of continuation utility promised
by the principal if she were to offer the contract. Results of this exercise are again
very similar to those in Figure C.2 and are thus omitted here.
2.3.3 Formal Analysis of the Regime Switching Model
While numerical simulations provide intuitive and transparent stories, I now formally
state and prove the results. In addition to being mathematically rigorous, the formal
argument also provides new insights into some important and controversial topics in
the research on executive compensation.
The argument for more immediate payments under the limited commitment con-
tract consists of two major steps, both of which are stated relative to the full commit-
ment contract: (1) since the payment boundary is lower when volatility is higher, at
13 See TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg. 28,394, 28,410
(June 15, 2009)
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the time of regime switching, the agent’s continuation utility is adjusted downward,
closer to the payment boundary; (2) when the drift of the agent’s continuation utility
process is low, being closer to the payment boundary implies a higher likelihood of
reaching that boundary and incurring cash compensation in a shorter period of time,
suggesting more frequent payments immediately after the crisis hits. The argument
for a higher turnover rate is relatively simpler: the agent’s adjusted continuation u-
tility after the volatility increase is also closer to the termination boundary, because
the limited commitment contract gives managers less financial slack when the cash
flow signal is noisier.
Adjustment in the Agent’s Wealth
The first step in formally showing the result of crisis time compensation is to derive
the adjustment of the agent’s continuation utility δpW q. Consider the full commit-
ment contract first. The optimal contract characterized in Proposition 2.3.1 suggests
that W is discontinuous at the time of the uncertainty shock. Such discontinuity aris-
es because the principal adjusts the shadow value of the agent’s wealth optimally to
keep incentives the same before and after the shock, which is reflected by the slope
matching procedure introduce in Propositions 2.3.1. However, such equalization of
incentive is not always viable as the two value functions corresponding to each state
have different ranges of slopes. In particular at the termination boundary, because
VspRq “ L for both s but VlpW q ą VhpW q for all W imply V 1l pRq ą V 1hpRq. By
concavity, V 1hpRq ą V 1hpW q for every W ą R. Therefore, there is some cut-off level
WF such that if the agent’s wealth before the uncertainty shock, denoted by Wt´ ,
falls below WF , the principal simply cannot keep the same marginal value of agent’s
wealth after the shock. Consequently the contract is terminated as soon as the shock
occurs.
This same argument applies to limited commitment contracts, but the difference
36
lies in the sign of δlpW q (full commitment) and δLl pW q (limited commitment) given
each W . Figure C.3 Panel A illustrates the change in δlpW q and δLl pW q as functions
of the agent’s wealth W before the state transition. Both the full commitment and
limited commitment contracts are presented to offer comparison. Note that there is a
kink point, before which δlpW q and δLl pW q both first starts from 0 and then descends
until the kink. This represents the region in which contracts are terminated once the
uncertainty shock arrives. However, the full commitment and limited commitment
contracts behave very differently thereafter: while δlpW q for the full commitment
contract continues to grow until it becomes positive, δLl pW q remains negative all the
way to the payment boundary for the limited commitment case. This suggests that if
the agent has accumulated sufficiently good performance before the shock, the size of
δpW q takes different values depending on the different payment boundaries specified
according to the type of the contract.
The observation from Panel A of Figure C.3 can be formally summarized in the
following proposition:
Proposition 2.3.2. There exist cut-off levels of the agent’s continuation utility xW
such that if Wt´ ą xW :
δlpWt´q ą 0
δLl pWt´q ă 0
This proposition links the type of contract to different predictions of the “pay-
for-luck” phenomenon documented by empirical works such as Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan (2001) and Axelson and Baliga (2009). These studies find that manager’s
compensation is related to market performance beyond their control, which is contra-
dictory to earlier standard contract theories such as Holmstrom (1982) which argues
that the principal should filter out any signals unrelated to the manager’s own per-
formance. Many theories motivated by this contradiction have been developed in
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recent years, most of which feature some kind of managerial entrenchment or hidden
talent that is partly related to market signals. See Bebchuk and Fried (2006) and
Jenter and Kanaan (2010) for a more detailed survey.
In contrast to existing theories, pay-for-luck is a natural feature of the regime
switching model used in this chapter. As the agent is not responsible for the oc-
currence of uncertainty shocks, his continuation utility from the contract is indeed
adjusted to keep its marginal value to the principal unchanged. However, whether
that adjustment corresponds to a “reward” or a “punishment” depends on the prin-
cipal’s commitment power. The full commitment contract rewards the agent with
higher continuation value when uncertainty is higher. Considering higher uncertainty
naturally as “bad luck” since firm value is lower in this state, this prediction is less
intuitive. On the contrary, when the principal has limited commitment, agents are
“punished” for higher uncertainty as their continuation value is brought down. In
fact, if the model allows recurring state transitions, the direction of δ flips signs when
the state switches from “crisis” to “normal”, and the limited commitment contract
predicts a “reward” for “good luck”, which is largely consistent with the empirical
findings.
It should be noted nonetheless that here neither the “reward” nor “punishment”
involves any instant cash transfer. As W measures the agent’s present value of all
future payments, the adjustment of W is merely a reflection of the different payment
boundaries and termination likelihood. The actual payments are related not only to
the shift in boundaries but also the distance between the boundaries and the agent’s
continuation value after the adjustment. The next result based on Proposition 2.3.2
sheds light on this point:
Corollary 2.3.2. Let Wt´ be the agent’s continuation utility before the uncertainty
shock, and Wt` ” Wt´ ` δlpWt´q and WLt` ” Wt´ ` δLl pWt´q be the agent’s continua-
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tion utility after the uncertainty shock under full and limited commitment contract,
respectively, then
W
L
h ´WLt` ă W h ´Wt` , if Wt´ ą xW .
This result is illustrated in Panel B of Figure C.3. It shows that while the payment
boundary of the limited commitment contract is lower, the agent’s adjusted contin-
uation utility after the uncertainty shock is also closer to the payment boundary.
This conclusion plays a leading role in the analysis of compensation later, as being
close to the payment boundary implies a larger probability of receiving more cash
payments in the near future. At the same time, a lower payment boundary suggests
a higher likelihood of contract termination following a series of poor performances.
This trade-off between immediate cash payments and likelihood of termination is the
central mechanism behind the dynamics of compensation.
After establishing the direction of δpW q and the position of Wt` relative to the
payment boundary, I can formalize the observations from the simulation example
using standard methods in stochastic calculus. The argument is presented in the
next subsection
Analytical Characterization
Here I characterize the dynamics of compensation following uncertainty shocks. Giv-
en any Wt` , the agent’s continuation utility after the volatility increase, the goal is
to characterize the distribution of the agent’s wealth after a certain amount of time
elapses. Following Cox and Miller (1977), given the dynamics of W , the transi-
tion density function fpt,W ;Wt`q for a process starts with Wt` and satisfies the
Kolmogorov forward equation:
B
Btfpt,W ;Wt`q “
1
2
B2
BW 2
“
λ2σ2hfpt,W ;Wt`q
‰´ BBW rγWfpt,W ;Wt`qs
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subject to boundary conditions:
fpt, R;Wt`q “ 0
1
2
B
BW
“
λ2σ2hfpt,W ;Wt`q
‰ |W“Wh ´ γW hfpt,W h;Wt`q “ 0
Unfortunately, this partial differential equation is generally intractable. However,
when γ is small, the dynamics of W can be approximated by a standard Brownian
motion with one absorbing boundary R and one reflecting boundary W h, whose
transition density has an explicit form14. Details on the approximation and the
derivation of the transition density are shown in the Appendix by virtue of the
method developed in Ward and Glynn (2003)
After obtaining the transition density, I can measure the likelihood of cash pay-
ments given a certain time period T after the shock using the concept of local time
in stochastic processes. Given a time period T and initial point Wt` , define local
time L
LhpT ;Wt`q “ lim
εÑ0
1
2ε
ż T
0
1tWh´εăWtăWh`εudt|W0 “ Wt`
where 1t¨u is the indicator function. This local time is a random variable that mea-
sures the amount of time W spends in the neighborhood of the payment boundary.
Since being at the payment boundary implies cash payments, this can be interpreted
as the frequency of payments an agent with initial wealth Wt` receives within time
T after the economy enters crisis mode.
The interesting value is the expectation of local time given by
E rLhpT ;Wt`qs “ lim
εÑ0
1
2ε
ż T
0
dt
ż Wh`ε
Wh´ε
fpt,W ;Wt`qdW
14 The assumption γ ą r is still needed for the benchmark full commitment contract to exist. It
is not necessary, though, for the limited commitment contract. See the end of Section 3.2. for the
discussion
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This value measures the expected frequency of cash payments given initial wealth
Wt` . The higher this value, the more frequently the agent can expect to receive cash
payments before time T during the crisis. As the numerical simulations show, under
the limited commitment contract, agents on average receive cash payments more
frequently for a short period immediately after the crisis begins. This observation
can now be stated formally using the expected local time defined above. Last but
not least, the numerical simulations begin with a random agent’s wealth in the
low variance state. In order for the analytical results to better match those from
simulations as well as what is seen in practice, I need to replace the fixed initial
wealth Wt` in the high variance state with the agent’s wealth Wt´ in the low variance
state. Thanks to Proposition 2.3.2 and Corollary 2.3.2 there is a one to one mapping
between the two variables which allows me to summarize the analytical finding in
the next proposition.
Proposition 2.3.3. Assume γ is small. There exists pT and xWt´ such that if T ă pT :
EL rLhpT ;Wt´qs ą E rLhpT ;Wt´qs
EL rLhpT ;Wt´qs ą EL rLlpT ;Wt´qs
for all Wt´ ą xWt´, where EL represents expectation under the limited commitment
contract
Proposition 2.3.3 provides the formal conditions under which the frequency of
payments is higher under the limited commitment contract, in the high volatility
state. Despite the mathematical complexity, its basic intuition is quite simple: first,
compare the limited and full commitment contract, Corollary 2.3.2 shows W is closer
to the payment boundary after the uncertainty shock under the limited commitment
contract. When γ is small, the process ofW behaves similarly to a standard Brownian
motion and thus spends more time at the payment boundary whenever the starting
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point is closer to the boundary. In more intuitive terms, the agent should expect
more frequent payments in the near future if his cumulative performance is closer
to the target bonus hurdle set by his contract. The similar argument applies to
the comparison between the limited commitment contract in low and high volatility
states: Wt` is closer to W
L
h than Wt´ is to W
L
l .
Why does Proposition 2.3.3 hold only when T is small? This is because while
Wt` is closer to the payment boundary after the shock under the full commitment
contract, it is also closer to the termination boundary because the agent is overall
punished according to Proposition 2.3.2. As T increases, the likelihood of contract
termination rises faster for the limited commitment contract. That is, agents now
operate under tighter financial slack. The longer into a crisis, the more likely is
termination, as the possibility of realizing a series of losses becomes more real. The
conclusion in Proposition 2.3.3 thus holds only for T small enough, when the prob-
ability of termination is negligible. As shown by the numerical simulations, this
pertains to the second observation that cash payment vanishes very quickly under
the high volatility state under limited commitment. The notion of termination like-
lihood can be formally described using the concept of stopping time, as the next
proposition shows:
Proposition 2.3.4. Define τs “ inf
 
t : Wt “ R|W s
(
as the termination time given
payment threshold W s then:
ELpτhq ă ELpτlq
ELpτhq ă Epτhq
When the commitment constraint is binding, the agent’s expected termination time
is shorter under high volatility
Intuitively, given the absorbing boundary R and reflecting boundary W h, a pro-
cess with initial value Wt` is in expectation stopped earlier whenever Wt` is closer
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to R and W h is smaller. The limited commitment contract satisfies both conditions.
Further, it should be noted that this proposition does not require the assumption
of a small γ, as the expected speed of growth for W is lower when Wt` is lower,
which the limited commitment contract again satisfies. Nevertheless the proof of
Proposition 2.3.4 still imposes the restriction on γ for the sole purpose of analytical
tractability.
The results of this subsection imply that the recipients of crisis time bonuses are
those who perform relatively well before the crisis. Proposition 4 states that more
frequent cash compensation is conditional on the agent’s wealth before the shock
Wt´ surpassing a certain threshold, and higher Wt´ represents better before-shock
performance. Those who perform relatively poorly ex ante are no longer around
after the crises as a result of either replacement or firm liquidation. Combined with
Proposition 2.3.2, this suggests that those who produce the largest profits before
the crisis are being criticized the most for receiving bonuses during the crisis. One
should keep in mind, however, that the huge loss of firm wealth is primarily due to
the risky aggregate environment and, despite receiving bonuses for a short period
into the crisis, managers are being harmed overall.
The optimal contract derived in this chapter is not renegotiation-proof, which
may raise a legitimate concern but does not affect the main results. Renegotiation-
proof contracts require the value function to be downward sloping everywhere. In
the Appendix I derive the renegation-proof contract and show that the main result-
s carry through. Despite the principal having only limited power of commitment,
renegotiation-proofness is not a necessary feature of the resulting equilibrium con-
tract, because it is assumed in the model that the principal can commit not to rene-
gotiate the contract but just cannot commit to when to terminate the contracting
relationship.
The assumption of constant liquidation value L and reservation utility R for
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both high and low volatility states is for the sake of simplicity but could be extended
to better match reality. It is quite plausible that both outside options could have
state-contingent values. Managers could have difficulty finding another job if laid off
during crisis times. Similarly, if L is interpreted as the fixed cost for firms to replace
an incumbent manager, both L and R should be lower in the high volatility state.
Nevertheless, allowing reservation value to be state-contingent does not affect the
validity of the main results. The renegotiation-proof contracts discussed in the Ap-
pendix feature endogenous renegotiation boundaries, which are lower when volatility
is higher, similar to assuming a lower R in the high volatility state. The main re-
sults of this chapter still hold under the renegotiation-proof contracts because they
depend mainly on the relative positions of the payment boundaries. As for the liqui-
dation value L, a lower value implies a lower value for the principal’s outside option,
thus reducing the tightness of the commitment constraint imposed on the contract.
Therefore, whether more frequent cash bonuses are paid in the high volatility state
simply depends on the decrease in L relative to the increase in σ.
2.4 Extensions
In this section I discuss two extensions of my main model. One, the implementation of
the limited commitment contract, which justifies the limited commitment constraint
by revealing a similarity between a firm’s commitment to a contract termination
time and its commitment to a capital structure. Two, I explore the equilibrium in
which shirking is optimal and its implications for both empirical studies and policy
recommendations
2.4.1 Contract Implementation, Capital Structure and the Commitment Constraint
Results from the previous section highlight different dynamics of compensation gen-
erated by full commitment contracts and limited commitment contracts. In this
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section I further explore the difference between those contracts via contract imple-
mentation and establish a novel equivalence between firms’ commitment to compen-
sation contracts and commitment to capital structure. The equivalence provides a
justification for the limited commitment assumption made throughout this chapter,
as firms’ commitment to capital structure is known to be implausible.
Implementing the full commitment contract involves the use of debt and equity,
and thus creating a conflict between debt and equity holders that leads to poten-
tial commitment issues. When the regime switches from low to high volatility, the
face value of debt must be brought down at the expense of equity holders. Such
implementation imposes an implicit assumption that equity holders must commit
to maintain a certain capital structure, which is generally implausible since equity
holders do not always act for the benefit of the entire firm. In contrast, contracts
with limited commitment do not require firms to make such commitment to capital
structure and should thus be more prevalent in practice.
The implementation in this chapter follows the standard literature in using a set
of common securities with limited liability: equity, long-term debt, and credit line.
Equity can be held by both the manager as well as outside investors who receive
dividend payments and can decide the firm’s capital structure. The long-term debt
is a callable consol bond that pays a fixed rate and has a fixed face value. The firm
can issue more long-term debt or call it back at its face value 15. Finally, the credit
line provides the manager with limited liquidity. The manager decides both the
dividend and the credit line balance, but incentive compatibility under the optimal
contract renders irrelevant who makes dividend and credit line decisions.
There is more than one implementation of the optimal contract. The following
proposition provides a standard result:
15 Although callable debt is usually redeemed at a premium, the specific value of the premium does
not play a role in this model and is thus without loss of generality assumed to be zero.
45
Proposition 2.4.1. Both the full and limited commitment contract can be imple-
mented by
(a) manager holding inside equity share λ;
(b) face value of the callable debt satisfying Ds “ VspW sq;
(c) credit line balance Mt and credit limit C
˚ satisfying Wt “ λpCs˚ ´Mtq and
λCs˚ “ W s.
Dividend is paid when Mt “ 0. Liquidation occurs when Mt reaches Cs˚ .
The implementation is intuitive and hence the explanation here concise. Since λ
measures the portion of private benefits the manager can derive from shirking, its
value represents the least degree of sensitivity to cash flow to which the manager is
exposed. Managers can draw down the line of credit for operating liquidity. Divi-
dends serve as reward to the manager as well as returns to outside investors. Since
the manager has a higher discount rate, dividends will not be saved inside the firm
as long as the credit line is paid in full. Finally, the amount of long-term debt is
used to adjust the profit rate of the firm such that incentives remain unchanged.
Security implementation of the optimal contract implies a certain capital struc-
ture which can potentially raise questions under the regime switching environment:
the boundary conditions of the full commitment contract implies VhpW hq ă VlpW lq.
Since VhpW hq and VlpW lq also correspond to the face value of the callable debt in
the high and low volatility state, the implementation of the full commitment con-
tract requires that the face value of long-term debt be brought down when volatility
increases. In other words, some portion of the long-term debt must be called back,
hence the usage of callable debt here. These callbacks induce a transfer of wealth
out of equity holders’ pockets while debt holders are paid in full.
To further investigate this problem, I compute the value of the aforementioned
securities, in particular that of equity. To simplify the analysis, I assume that L “ 0,
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so that there will be no residual value in the event of firm liquidation, eliminating
the need to specify the priority of residual claims among equity holders and debt
holders. Let V Es denote the equity value, which is defined by
V EpWtq “ E
ˆż τ
t
e´rsdDivs|Wt
˙
where Wt, the manager’s continuation utility, can be transferred to Mt, the credit
line balance, through the relationship defined in Proposition 2.4.1.
The value function of equity value can be characterized by the following differen-
tial equation:
rV Es pW q “ pγW ´ pisδspW qqV E1s ` 12λ
2σ2sV
E2
s ` pispV Eps pW ` δspW qq ´ V Es pW qq
subject to boundary conditions
V Es p0q “ 0
V E1s pW sq “ 1
where V Eps is the value of equity in state ps The implementation requires equity holders
to commit to the particular capital structure specified in the optimal contract by
redeeming the outstanding debt at the time of the uncertainty shock.
Do equity holders always find it preferable to recall debt when uncertainty is
high? The answer is hardly yes, as equity holders can usually withdraw investment
in practice and default on any debt obligation. In this model, let Dps ´Ds measure
the value of debt redemption. Equity holders will find it optimal to default when
V Eps , the value from maintaining the firm, is lower than pDps ´Dsq, the cost of doing
so. On the contrary, under the limited commitment contract, VspW q “ L for both
s “ l and h implies an identical face value of long-term debt before and after regime
switching. That is, the capital structure of the limited commitment contract can be
maintained without a tendency on the part of equity holders to default ex post.
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Equity holders’ making ex post default decisions is common in both financial
research and in practice. There is a large body of literature studying the endogenous
default decision of equity holders and the conflict with debt holders, notably Leland
(1994), Leland and Toft (1996), He and Xiong (2012). In this chapter, I do not
characterize the exact default boundary of equity holders; rather, the point I want to
make is that equity holders cannot (credibly) commit to not defaulting for the sake
of the entire firm when there is a chance of their finding default preferable ex post.
In additional to justifying the prevalence of limited commitment contracts in
practice, the equivalence between the commitment to contract termination time and
the commitment to capital structure also offers an empirically testable hypothesis:
investors of more distressed firms are more likely to withdraw their investment, de-
fault on firms’ debt and alter firms’ capital structure. The degree of distress can be
a potential proxy for the commitment power firms have over their labor contracts
which is difficult to observe.
2.4.2 Optimal Compensation with Shirking
Throughout previous analyses, it has been assumed that working is always preferred
by the principal regardless of the level of uncertainty. This section relaxes this as-
sumption and examines when the optimal contract allows shirking in equilibrium.
The results carry both policy and empirical implications. When the contract al-
lows shirking during crisis times, no bonuses are paid. This may appear agreeable
to policymakers and to public sentiment, but it is actually worse because the av-
erage productivity of the economy is lower as a result of lower managerial effort.
Empirically, studies of compensation and performance, such as those examining pay-
performance sensitivity, could be confounded by the endogeneity between return and
volatility driven by unobservable changes in managerial effort.
Which effort level is optimal in equilibrium depends on the cost of allowing shirk-
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ing. Working is preferred as long as C, the social cost of shirking measured by the
reduction in average cash flow, is high. This section explores this assumption in more
detail. Consider a contract that involves no payment but simply allows the agent to
shirk forever. Define pW S, V Sq as the pair of payoffs for the agent and the principal
respectively if the agent exerts effort et “ e for all t, then
W S “ λC
γ
;
V S “ 1
r
ˆ
µ´ λC
γ
˙
. (2.10)
Notice that this payoff is a function of A, which is an irrelevant variable in the
incentive compatible contract characterized in Proposition 2.2.1 and 2.3.2. Therefore,
whether the incentive compatible contract is optimal for the principal depends on the
level of V S. When C is sufficiently low, V S ą V pW ˚q, where V pW ˚q ” maxV pW q
is the maximal value the principal can derive from an incentive compatible contract,
the principal is better off stopping incentive provision16. The agent will choose
to shirk, receive no payment from the principal and instead be compensated by his
private benefit from shirking. The optimal contract is static, unrelated to the agent’s
performance, and therefore involves no termination.
The different maximal firm value under low and high volatility states raises the
possibility that working is not always optimal for both states. If V ˚l ą V S ą Vh˚ ,
the optimal contract will induce working as long as s “ l and switches to the static
contract at times when s “ h. In the model where only one state transition occurs,
the dynamics of the optimal contract follow the ODEs described in Proposition 2.3.2,
except the value function Vh is replaced by the static payoff given by equation (2.10).
16 Strictly speaking, the contract that allows shirking forever is optimal only when V S ą BpW q,
where BpW q is a V-shaped function that extends above V ˚h . See Zhu (2012) for the details. Here
I avoid the complicated situations where V S lies above b˚ but below BpW q by assuming that C
is either high enough or low enough so that either working or shirking permanently is the optimal
effort.
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If shirking is optimal in the high volatility state, the procedure that pins down
δlpW q is slightly different. Under the static contract that allows shirking when s “ h,
the agent’s continuation utility is a singleton W S. Jumps of W from the low to the
high volatility state is simply δlpW q “ W S´W . Note that W S measures not the dis-
counted future income but the present value of private shirking benefit to the agent.
This value is automatically achieved as long as the principal immediately ceases any
payment. Moreover, because W S is no longer sensitive to the agent’s performance,
there is no contract termination after the regime switches to high volatility. All firms
survive regardless of their agent’s performance history up to the regime switching
time. The next proposition summarizes these findings:
Proposition 2.4.2. Suppose C is low or σh is sufficiently high, the optimal contract
induces et “ e under σl but et “ e under σh. The principal’s value function VlpW q
and payment boundaries W l satisfy:
rVlpW q “ µ` pγW ´ pilδlpW qqV 1l pW q ` 12λ
2σ2LV
2
l pW q
`pil pVh ´ VlpW qq
subject to boundary conditions VlpRq “ L; V 1l pW lq “ ´1; and V 2l pW lq “ 0. Further-
more, δlpW q “ W S ´W “ λCγ ´W , and Vh is given by
Vh “ V S “ 1
r
ˆ
µ´ λC
γ
˙
.
The existence of an optimal contract that involves shirking in the equilibrium
has important policy implications. Since the manager is compensated through the
private benefit of shirking when uncertainty is high, no cash payment is made under
that regime. This implies the possibility of observing little or no bonuses during a
recession. However, though much to the media or public’s liking, this equilibrium is
actually worse in terms of total welfare, because productivity, measured by mean cash
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flow, is now lower due to less effort from managers. This is true as long as λ ă 1
so that there is deadweight loss associated with managerial shirking. This result
highlights the importance of compensation in keeping mangers properly incentivized,
even though the exact timing of their compensation may not match their overall
performance at the time when a large negative shock occurs.
The shirking equilibrium also reveals a potential endogeneity problem between
profitability and volatility. Existing empirical work that studies compensation often
considers profitability and volatility as independent factors. However, fluctuation
in profitability can be driven by the change in volatility through the channel of
managerial effort, raising empirical challenges since such effort is normally difficult
to measure. It also provides further evidence in addition to previous work that
uncertainty is the key to understanding the recent financial crisis.
It is worth noting that the change in the agent’s equilibrium effort is a feature
of increasing volatility but not necessarily of decreasing profitability. This sets this
paper apart from those with similar regime switching techniques such as Hoffmann
and Pfeil (2010). While lower average cash flow µ does bring down firm value under
an incentive compatible contract, it also lowers V S, firm value under a static contract
that allows shirking. As a result, working can still be the optimal effort to induce
if V S ă Vh˚ . In contrast, V S does not depend on σ, but Vh˚ does. When cash
flow volatility becomes higher, Vh˚ becomes lower until falling below V
S, and the
incentive compatible contract is dominated by the static contract, a unique feature
of stochastic volatility.
2.5 Remarks
This chapter studies the optimal compensation contract under the twin assumptions
of limited commitment by the principal and regime switching of cash flow volatility.
Sudden and dramatic increases in market uncertainty have been argued as the most
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critical aspect of financial crises. When uncertainty is high, investment becomes
more risky, and the value of continuing the firm is correspondingly low. Principals
without full commitment cannot credibly pledge sufficient amounts of future pay-
ments and must provide agents with more immediate compensation. This offers an
explanation for the highly controversial large compensation–especially cash bonuses–
paid by many financial firms during the recent crisis. At the same time, managers
are subject to a higher turnover rate. Therefore, despite the bonuses, managers are
still worse off in crisis times as their overall present value from the contract is lower.
The model provides a new perspective on the current compensation structure
not only in regard to bonuses. While equity-based compensation contracts provide
a solution to the problem of aligning managers’ incentives with those of investors,
their effectiveness depends on the ability of both parties to commit to the contract.
Furthermore, payment and expected tenure are two counter weights both endoge-
nously determined in the optimal contract. Any measure that intends to provide
better long-term incentives to managers must take into account both payment and
the expected contract length.
There are several directions in which this model can be fruitfully extended. In
the model there is only one representative firm and one representative agent, so the
uncertainty shock can be interpreted as either aggregate or idiosyncratic. A model
that allows firm heterogeneity and differentiates idiosyncratic shocks from aggregate
shocks may generate interesting results, such as the cross-sectional predictions re-
garding the response of compensation to firm level investment risks. This model
also potentially speaks to the the important issue of liquidity management in re-
sponse to market downturns. Recent studies such as Campello et al. (2011) examine
cross-sectional liquidity management along different dimensions. A slightly modi-
fied dynamic model a` la Bolton et al. (2011) would be readily equipped to provide
theoretical insights for these observations.
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3Dynamic Investment and Asset Prices
In the past two decades, the world has witnessed the rapid integration of international
financial markets. Prior to the recent financial crisis, gross inter-country capital
flows surged from 1.5 trillion US dollars in 1995 to about 11.8 trillion dollars in 2007.
During this process, developed economies, such as. the US, ran large deficits whereas
emerging economies, such as. China, large surpluses. Existing research on financial
integration has focused mainly on its impact on the US market. However, given their
explosive growth and increasing importance in the international economy, emerging
markets warrant greater attention from researchers.
This chapter expands our understanding of financial integration by examining
for the first time its impact on emerging markets. More specifically, this chapter
studies the two most prominent effects of financial integration observed for emerging
markets: (1) savings gluts, referring to the upsurge in domestic savings, and (2) asset
price booms. Figure 1 compares the gross savings rate of the US to that of emerging
East Asian countries and China in particular. We observe stark differences in the
savings behavior between the US and the latter two. The term ”savings glut” was
first addressed by Bernanke (2005), who argues that high domestic savings of many
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emerging economies is the source of global financial account imbalance. Subsequent
research provides detailed measurement of savings gluts for cross-country and time
series samples1. More interestingly, savings gluts in emerging economies largely take
the form of foreign risk-free assets such as US treasury bills. Figure 2 shows an
example of the price boom: the housing price in China. In general empirical studies
have document significant asset price increase in capital outflow countries2. Although
most noticeable in the real estate market, price booms are generally observable in
other markets, such as the stock market, as well. Glindro et al. (2007), Gochoco-
Bautista (2008), Igan and Jin (2010) etc offer more detailed documentation on how
asset price booms are related to a country’s saving behaviors.
The simultaneous occurrence of savings gluts and asset price booms implies a
complementary relationship between domestic risky assets and foreign risk free assets
for emerging economies. This is puzzling because the two assets are more naturally
thought of as substitutes. Indeed, the current literature, which focuses on the US and
generally takes as given the behavior of emerging economies, predicts substitution:
increase in demand for foreign risk free assets decreases demand for and hence the
price of domestic risky assets.
In this chapter I provide a highly tractable continuous time dynamic model that
explains the phenomenon of simultaneous savings gluts and asset price booms ob-
served in emerging economies during the integration of financial markets worldwide.
Financial integration provides firms in emerging economies with a foreign risk free
asset when they could only hold a risky domestic asset before. While firms substitute
their investment in the domestic risky asset with the foreign risk free asset, i.e. the
substitution effect, the introduction of the risk free asset also generates another effec-
1 For instance Bernanke (2007), IMF (2007), Bayoumi et al. (2010), Ma and Yi (2010), Yang et al.
(2010) etc
2 See, for example, Rajan (2006a), Ferguson and Schularick (2007), Wu et al. (2012)
54
t: the wealth effect : holding a less risky portfolio because of the addition of the risk
free asset, firms are more likely to accumulate large wealth before incurring losses
from their investment in the risky asset. The stationary distribution of firm wealth
skews more to the left in equilibrium, meaning that more firms are made richer after
financial integration. When the wealth effect dominates, the overall value invested
in both the domestic risky asset and the foreign risk free asset increases, leading to
a higher domestic asset price as well as a higher aggregate savings rate.
There has been a number of studies analyzing the cause and consequences of
such direction of capital flows. Most notably Caballero et al. (2008), Caballero
and Krishnamurthy (2009), Mendoza et al. (2009), Angeletos and Panousi (2011),
and Maggiori (2012). The closest to this chapter is Mendoza et al. (2009), who
build a two-country model where the domestic environment of contract enforceability
predicts the change of emerging countries’ portfolio from their domestic risky assets
to risk free assets supplied by developed countries, but the subsequent substitution
effect drives asset prices in emerging countries down instead of up. Existing research,
due to a US focus, has been taking emerging economy characteristics as exogenous
and failed to explain why in emerging economies domestic risky assets and foreign
risk free assets appear to be complements rather than substitutes.
This chapter addresses this complementarity puzzle through a continuous-time,
reduced-form investment model similar to Bolton et al. (2011). Firms make pay-
out and portfolio choice decisions but are subject to costly refinancing when their
capital level is low. Because of refinancing costs, firm are effectively risk averse
even though they value dividends in a risk-neutral manner. Moreover, firms’ degree
of risk aversion is endogenous and depends on the overall risk of their investment
portfolio. Modeling in continuous time gives me the crucial advantage of analytical-
ly tracking the distribution of firm wealth, a technique widely used in the growing
continuous-time macro finance studies such as Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012),
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He and Krishnamurthy (2013a,b) etc. Different from those studies, I focus on the
steady state analysis to simplify the solution, but this model can be easily extend-
ed to study the full dynamics of firm wealth distribution given the continuous-time
method.
Considering savings gluts and asset price booms together allows new insights into
understanding the impact of financial integration on emerging economies. It leads
to the counterintuitive revelation that high domestic asset price and savings glut
concentrated in foreign assets are fundamentally linked and reinforces each other. It
also shows how different economic fundamentals, such as investment risk and return,
contribute to movements in asset price and savings rate during financial integration.
Comparative statics predict all of the following to magnify asset price booms and
savings gluts: high domestic investment return, low domestic investment risk, low
international interest rates, and high external financing costs. These predictions are
broadly consistent with empirical findings on emerging markets and able to nest the
conclusions of several existing theories, such as “liquidity gluts” and “investment
slumps”, that explain the movement in either asset price or savings rate in emerging
countries.
The model builds on two important market frictions prevalent among emerging
economies: first, limited commitment prevents firms from borrowing as they cannot
credibly pledge future income. The combination of risky investment in domestic
assets and limited commitment gives firms the demand for precautionary savings,
which they meet using the risk free asset available after financial integration. Limited
commitment continues to apply after financial integration such that firms still cannot
borrow but are able to hold positive positions in the risk free asset. Second, costly
external financing makes firms risk averse because they want to avoid the cost of
raising new capital when their net worth is low. The cost of financing must be
sufficiently high to result in asset price booms and savings gluts in this model. This
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is because higher financing costs imply stronger risk aversion and consequently a
stronger wealth effect.
This chapter also broadens the implication of limited contract commitment on
financial markets. Limited commitment refers to the lack of ability to credibly pledge
future income when firms are short on liquidity, which is the key financial friction
modeled in this chapter. Previous work by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Krishna-
murthy (2003), Cooley et al. (2004), and Lorenzoni (2008) explores the aggregate
implication under limited commitment especially for asset prices in closed economies,
while this chapter focuses on an open economy. I also conduct welfare analysis in a
similar manner to Lorenzoni (2008), who derives ex ante over-investment as a result
of limited commitment and decentralized trading. My results share similar features
but have different implications for the optimal level of asset price and the distribution
of firm wealth.
The high level of asset price and savings rate resulting from financial integration
is inefficient, however, compared to the socially optimal level. In the decentralized
economy, firms’ portfolio choice determines the equilibrium domestic asset price,
imposing a pecuniary externality which firms do not internalize. A social planner,
taking into account the effect of firm choices on the equilibrium asset prices, places
more weight on the international risk free bond, resulting in a lower asset price
and savings rate. The portfolio choice of the social planner provides a rationale for
the large holdings of US treasury securities by the government of many emerging
economies. Finally, the socially optimal portfolio choice can be implemented for
the competitive market via government taxation and subsidy, which leads to several
policy recommendations.
Savings gluts and asset price booms can be amplified and empirically predicted
by heterogeneous productivity, a feature prevalent on emerging economies’ markets.
Recent literature has conflicting views on the role of productivity heterogeneity in
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determining asset prices and investment in emerging economies. I find that the larger
the mean-preserving spread in firm productivity, the stronger the effect of financial
frictions on asset price booms and savings gluts. This is because when firms are
heterogeneous, their portfolio choice is not only affected by asset returns but also
their relative risk aversion from holding risky assets. I find that firms with lower
productivity are more risk averse. In autarky, this implies low asset price and savings
rate because assets are less valuable. In financial integration, low productivity firms
engage in more precautionary savings and consequently increase asset prices more.
The results suggest the empirical implication that cross-country differences in asset
price and savings rate can be explained by heterogeneity among domestic firm and
the productivity level of the least productive firms.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 describes the model and intro-
duces the key market frictions. Section 3.2 solves and compares asset prices and
savings rates under different equilibriums and presents comparative statics. In Sec-
tion 3.3 I study the optimal asset portfolio choice problem from the perspective of
the social planner’s and make policy recommendations. In Section 3.4 I introduce
productivity heterogeneity and analyze its impact on asset allocation and total pro-
ductivity. Section 3.5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
3.1 Model
This section describes the basic environment of the model: one country, continuous
time, infinite horizon. I define two equilibriums: autarky, where the only asset avail-
able for investment is a domestic asset with fixed supply and risky return; financial
integration, where a risk free asset of infinite foreign supply is added.
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3.1.1 Autarky
There is one economy representing an emerging country, whose only domestic asset
is land. Land produces rice, which is perishable and used as the numeraire. Land
does not depreciate nor can it be re-produced, so its aggregate quantity is fixed over
time and is normalized to one unit.
The economy is populated with two types of agents: firms and households. Firms
are risk neutral with discount rate ρ. They make investment in land and produce
rice which can either be used to purchase more land or be paid out as dividends. A
firm holding Kt units of land can produce dYt units of rice according to
dYt “ KtdAt ,
where dAt “ µdt` σdZt is the idiosyncratic productivity of each firm. Importantly,
the technology shocks, represented by the standard Brownian motion term Zt, are
assumed to be i.i.d. across all firms. In other words, there is no aggregate shock
in this economy. Let dCt denote the dividend payout during a unit of time. Firms’
objective is to maximize the discounted value of total future dividends:
max
ż 8
0
e´ρtdCt .
The price of land is denoted by Pt. Firms all take Pt as given. The unit return from
investing in land is thus defined by
dRt “ dAt ` dPt
Pt
.
Firms are owned by households, who consume the dividends paid by firms but
cannot directly invest in land. To keep the households’ problem simple, I assume
they are hand-to-mouth consumers, holding completely diversified shares of all firms.
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Diversification implies that households are immune to firms’ idiosyncratic productiv-
ity shocks and simply consume a constant total output which equals µ. This ensures
that households play a minimal role in this economy so subsequent analyses can focus
on firms’ decisions3.
The key market friction in this emerging economy is limited commitment. Each
firm can default on its entire debt obligation while retaining all the land and rice
they have and cannot be excluded from future trading. Rampini and Viswanathan
(2013b) show that such limited commitment constraint is equivalent to a borrowing
capacity constraint, which in this model equals zero. As a result, there is no domestic
credit market because no firm can credibly pledge any future payment; land is the
only asset in which firms can invest; the price of land Pt is the only price that needs
to be determined endogenously in equilibrium, which greatly simplifies the solution.
In practice, limited commitment is prevalent among emerging economies. Cooley
et al. (2004) provide a measurement for contract enforceability for a large cross-
country panel. Unsurprisingly, countries with less developed financial markets are
generally associated with poorer contract commitment. Allen et al. (2005), Lu and
Tao (2009), Du et al. (2012) document weak contract commitment particularly in
China—the best example for the simultaneous savings gluts and asset price booms
discussed in this chapter. Here I make the assumption of zero credible future debt
payment, which completely shuts down the domestic credit market. Albeit extreme,
such assumption allows a much simpler, closed-form solution of firm dynamics and
the market equilibrium.
Given all the assumptions above, I now characterize the dynamics of firm net
worth, denoted by Wt, which follows a stochastic process between two boundaries:
3 I can also define households as standard risk averse utility optimizers and formally describe and
solve their optimization problem. However, as long as households cannot invest directly in land but
are allowed to hold completely diversified shares of all firms, the absence of aggregate risk implies
perfect consumption smoothing across time, which is equivalent to what is described here.
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payout boundary W and refinancing boundary W . First, firms will distribute div-
idends only when Wt is sufficiently high, due to the risk of holding land. W is a
reflecting boundary such that whenever Wt exceeds, lump sum dividends Wt ´W
are paid so that the process Wt immediately reflects back to W . Second, firms can-
not have negative net worth due to limited commitment. Because dAt follows an
arithmetic Brownian motion, large losses can occur and firms’ net worth approaches
zero, at which time firms must refinance by raising more capital4.
The limited commitment assumption also has important implications for how
firms can refinance: they cannot refinance through debt but issuance of new equity
only. In reality, equity issuance is seldom inexpensive, as it involves underwriter fees,
search costs, or agency costs. Here I abstract away from the mirco-market details by
making a reduced form assumption about issuance costs similar to the one used in
Bolton et al. (2011): firms must pay a fixed cost φ each time they raise new equity;
for each unit of net worth raised, there is a marginal cost 1` ξ where ξ ą 0. Those
costs imply that firms will only refinance when their net worth is sufficiently low. In
the next section, I will demonstrate how those refinancing costs can be translated
into boundary conditions which the solution of the firm’s optimization problem must
satisfy.
Firms do not engage in either payout or equity issuance when Wt lies in between
the payout and the refinancing boundaries. They simply accumulate wealth through
investing their entire net worth in land, which is the only durable asset available so
far. The dynamics of firm net worth follow
dWt “ WtdRt “ µWdt` σWdt .
The drift term µW and the diffusion term σW will be endogenously determined later.
Define V pW q as the value function of a firm given its net worth W . Using Ito’s
4 Firms can also choose to liquidate. I assume liquidation yields value zero, and the expected
return from production µ is high enough such that firms always prefer refinancing over liquidation
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Lemma, firm value follows the Hamiltonian-Jacobian-Bellman (HJB) equation:
ρV pW q “ µWV 1pW q ` 1
2
σ2WV
2pW q .
An equilibrium consists of the firms’ payout and their refinancing decisions that
solve the firm’s maximization problem subject to the dynamics of firm net worth
((3.1.1)). Moreover, the market for land must clear. Since the total supply of land
is fixed to be one, and firms save all their net worth in land, the total value of land
exactly equals the aggregate net worth of all firms, that is
ż
WtdF pWtq “ Pt ,
where F pWtq is the distribution of net worth. This market clearing condition pins
down the price of land in equilibrium. This equilibrium is referred to as the autarky
and serves as the benchmark.
3.1.2 Financial Integration
In autarky, firms can only invest in land, a domestic asset with a fixed supply and
risky return. In this section I characterize a new equilibrium after the economy is
integrated into the global financial market. Financial integration introduces a new
asset: risk free bonds traded on an international bond market. Risk free bonds are
supplied by foreign issuers in arbitrary amounts and have a fixed return of r units
of rice. Interest rate r is not affected by the demand of domestic firms.
The key assumption in autarky, limited commitment, still applies to domestic
firms in the international bond market: they can buy but are restricted from issuing
any bond because they are still unable to credibly pledge any future income. In an-
other words, domestic firms are lenders on the international market, consistent with
the observed direction of global capital flow from developing countries to developed
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countries.5
Limited commitment has long been recognized as an important friction not only
within emerging economies but in the international financial market as well. Kehoe
and Perri (2002) argue that international loans are, in general, difficult to enforce
due to different legal and cultural environments across countries. Bai and Zhang
(2010, 2012) found that despite financial liberalization, countries still vary greatly
in their ability to commit to debt payments, and thus there is inefficient global
risk sharing as a frictionless model would predict. Here, the implicit assumption is
that international bond suppliers have infinite borrowing capacity while domestic
firms have zero capacity, which keeps the model simple without losing important
qualitative predictions.
The introduction of risk free assets implies a non-trivial portfolio choice problem
for firms, who must allocate their net worth between the domestic risky asset, land,
and the foreign risk free asset, bonds. Let αt denote the fraction of firms’ net worth
invested in land, and 1´αt the holding of risk free bonds. The dynamics of Wt thus
follows
dWt “ αt
Pt
WtdRt ` p1´ αtqWtrdt . (3.1)
An equilibrium now consists of firms’ optimal payout and refinancing decisions plus
their portfolio choice αt, subject to limited commitment αt ď 1, and the dynamics
of firm net worth (3.1). The market clearing condition which pins down the price of
land is now ż
αtWtdF pWtq “ Pt . (3.2)
That is, the total fraction of firm net worth allocated to land equals the total value of
5 Although the direction of capital flow is the direct result of limited commitment, it can be endo-
genized using various techniques, for instance with different degrees of risk aversion a` la Maggiori
(2012). Since the focus of this chapter is not the cause but rather the domestic consequences of
capital outflow for emerging economies, the mechanism behind such capital outflow is kept as simple
as possible.
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land. This equilibrium is referred to as financial integration or integration in general.
To summarize the model so far, there is one economy in this model representing
emerging markets. Limited commitment implies firms in this economy can only accu-
mulate net worth through one domestic risky asset. Financial integration introduces
an international risk free asset with fixed return in which firms can also invest in
addition to the domestic risky asset. Firms pay off dividends when their net worth
is high and refinance through costly equity issuance when net worth is low.
3.2 Equilibrium Asset Prices and Aggregate Savings Rate
In this section I solve the equilibriums price of land under both autarky and financial
integration. I show that, under certain parameter restrictions, land price increases
after financial integration. I then define the aggregate savings rate and argue that
asset price booms and savings gluts can occur simultaneously after financial inte-
gration. I demonstrate that this result comes from the dominating wealth effect of
introducing risk free assets to firms’ portfolios: less risky portfolios make firms on
average wealthier in equilibrium and the total value invested in land is higher. I then
discuss the implications of this and present comparative statics.
3.2.1 Asset Prices
To analytically solve the model, I focus on the steady state equilibrium where the
price of land Pt does not change over time. The existence of the steady state will
be verified later. Dropping the time subscript of Pt implies dRt “ dAtP , that is the
return of land is the return from the output only. Substituting this back to dWt and
using Ito’s lemma, the value of the firm solves the HJB equation:
ρV pWtq “ max
αtď1
”´ µ
P
´ r
¯
αtWt ` rWt
ı
V 1pWtq ` 1
2
α2t
P 2
σ2W 2t V
2pWtq . (3.3)
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Firms pay out dividends when W exceeds the payout boundary W and refinance
through equity issuance when W falls below the refinancing boundary W . These
boundaries are determined by the following conditions:
V 1pW q “ 1 , (3.4)
V 1pW q “ 1` ζ , (3.5)
and
V pW q “ φ` p1` ζqW . (3.6)
The first condition states that, at the payment boundary W t, the shadow value of
firm’s net worth must equal the marginal value of the dividend, which is one because
of risk neutrality. The second condition comes from the fact that refinancing bears
a marginal cost of 1 ` ζ per unit of net worth that firms raise. The third condition
is value matching at the refinancing boundary, where a firm’s value should have no
discontinuity before and after refinancing.
Differentiating equation (3.3) with respect to αt, the usual first order condition
implies
αt “ ´µP ´ rP
2
σ2
V 1pWtq
WtV 2pWtq .
This solution of αt takes the typical Merton form: net return of the risky asset less
the risk free interest rate divided by the variance of return and multiplied by the
inverse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
The HJB equation (3.3) can potentially have multiple solutions. In this chapter I
will focus on one particular solution: constant αt. This means I conjecture and later
verify that V pWtq satisfies V 1pWtqV 2pWtq ´ 1βWt for some constant β. Therefore α “ µP´rP
2
βσ2
and is independent of time. The HJB equation is then simplified to
ρV “
˜
pµ´ rP q2
2β2σ2
` r
¸
WtV
1pWtq .
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This first order ordinary differential equation has the following close-form solu-
tion:
V pW q “ C1W γ ,
where C1 is a constant coefficient to be determined by matching the boundary con-
ditions. The algebraic details can be found in the Appendix. Matching boundary
conditions implies the following lemma:
Lemma 3.2.1. 0 ă γ ă 1 if r ă ρ.
This lemma implies that V pW q is a concave function with slope 1` ξ at the refi-
nancing boundary W and 1 at the payout boundary W . Put differently, even though
the firms are risk neutral, they exhibit investment behaviors similar to risk averse
investors. Two factors, lack of complete market and costly refinancing, contribute to
the risk aversion. Without limited commitment, optimal risk sharing among firms
implies complete hedging. Firms have no need for precautionary savings even though
investment in land is risky; if firms are allowed to take infinite losses, or if the cost
of raising one unit of net worth is exactly one, then the risk of hitting the refinanc-
ing boundary does not matter. Firms only consider expected return when choosing
between investing in land or risk free bonds because of the absence of aggregate
shocks.
The condition r ă ρ is necessary for a non-trivial solution: if the market risk
free interest rate is higher than firms’ discount rate, firms can save through risk free
bonds only and postpone the dividend payout forever. Nevertheless, this condition
does not necessarily mean that domestic firms are more impatient than international
debtors. It can be interpreted as transaction costs from trading on the international
market which bring down the effective interest rate of holding foreign risk free bonds
for domestic firms.
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The first order condition of αt also implies that in between W and W , the dy-
namics of Wt follow
dWt
W
“
«
pµ´ rP q2
βσ2
` r
ff
dt` µ´ rP
βσ
dZt . (3.7)
Notice that µ ą rP since P “ µ
ρ
is the price of land under the risk neutral measure,
which must be strictly higher than the price of land when firms are effectively risk
averse.
Equation (3.7) suggests that Wt is a geometric Brownian motion with two reflect-
ing barriers or RGBM for short. This type of processes has closed form stationary
distributions which makes solving the market clearing condition of land price possi-
ble. Consider a generic RGBM Wt, where
dWt
Wt
“ µWdt ` σWdZt between an upper
reflecting barrier W and a lower reflecting barrier W . Let η ” 2µW
σW
, Zhang and Du
(2010) show that the stationary distribution of Wt is given by the density function:
fpW q “ η ´ 1
W
η´1 ´W η´1
W η´2 . (3.8)
This density function is a power function that can be easily integrated to obtain its
expectation:
EpW q “
ż W
W
η ´ 1
W
η´1 ´W η´1
W η´1dW “ pη ´ 1q
η
´
W
η´1 ´xW η´1¯ `W η ´W η˘ . (3.9)
Since Wt is an RGBM under both autarky and financial integration, EpW q can
be calculated in the same way for different endogenous drift and diffusion terms
under both equilibriums. This allows me to analytically solve for and compare the
equilibrium land price P . Plugging EpW q into the market clearing condition of
autarky, EpW q “ P , and the market clearing condition of financial integration,
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αEpW q “ P , and noticing that
α “ µP ´ rP
2
βσ2
is a function of P in the steady state yield two systems of equations involving P and
β, where β is an implicit function of P . More details, including the explicit form of
the systems of equations, are given in the Appendix.
Deriving the equations for P allows me to examine the circumstances under which
asset price booms and savings gluts can arise simultaneously. An asset price boom
is defined as a higher domestic asset price P after financial integration than under
autarky. The following proposition gives the condition for its occurrence:
Proposition 3.2.1. (Asset Price Boom) Let PA be the price of the domestic risky
asset in the stationary equilibrium under autarky and P I be the price under financial
integration. Defining
3r ` p2r ´ 1qρ
ρ´ r ď
2φ p1` ξq2 ´ 1
pξ ` 2qpξ ` 1q
as Condition 1, then when Condition 1 holds,
P I ą PA .
Proposition 3.2.1 is the result of two conflicting effects on the demand of the
domestic risky asset brought about by the access to risk free bonds. On one hand,
there is a substitution effect, where risk free bonds reduce the demand of land, as
they can both serve as a means of precautionary savings for firms to avoid costly
refinancing. This is reflected by α ă 1 in the financial integration equilibrium. On
the other hand, there is also a wealth effect, where adding risk free bonds to firms’
portfolios reduces the overall riskiness of firms’ investments. Less likely to hit the
refinancing boundary, firms are in general richer in the steady state. Consequently,
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when the wealth effect dominates, even though firms only invest partially in land,
the total value of net worth saved through land is higher and so is the price of land.
The wealth effect can be further clarified through the stationary distribution of
RGBM in (3.8), which implies the cumulative distribution density (CDF) function
for any xW P pW,W q in the steady state is
F spxW q “ xW η´1 ´W η´1
W
η´1 ´W η´1
, (3.10)
where s P A, I denotes the state: autarky or financial integration. This density func-
tion is increasing in η and thus decreasing in σw, holding all other variables constant.
In the autarky equilibrium, σw equals
σ
P
, while in the integration equilibrium it e-
quals ασ
P
. That is, smaller share of net worth invested in land implies less likelihood
of Wt dropping. As a result, the stationary distribution of Wt is skewed more to
the left, and more firms stay near the pay-off boundary in equilibrium. If the dis-
tributional change is sufficiently strong, the aggregate wealth of the economy after
financial integration is much larger than under autarky, and the fraction of wealth
invested in land is also higher.
Proposition 3.2.1. is derived under the parameter restriction in Condition 1,
which in all its complexity can be effectively read as refinancing cost must be large
enough for the wealth effect to dominate. Economically, higher refinancing costs im-
ply that firms are more concerned about hitting the refinancing boundary, thereby
inducing stronger risk aversion which leads to a larger effect from risk free pre-
cautionary savings. Mathematically, higher refinancing costs imply a wider space
between the refinancing and payout boundaries for firms to accumulate net worth,
allowing more room for the distribution of firm net worth to change during financial
integration.
Although the extent to which Proposition 3.2.1 applies in reality depends on the
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actual level of financing costs, there are two reasons why the condition of sufficiently
high financing costs is likely to be met in practice. First, there is substantial empiri-
cal evidence that external financing is indeed costly in emerging economies.La Porta
et al. (1997, 1998, 2000) show that countries with less formal protection of creditor
rights and a poorer legal system of commitment have smaller domestic loans, nar-
rower debt markets, and greater difficulty in raising external financing. Allen et al.
(2005), Ayyagari et al. (2010) find costly informal financing in a country with less
developed formal financial markets. Secondly, one should take into account that Con-
dition 1, derived as a sufficient condition, can be potentially over restrictive. While
the necessary conditions are hard to derive explicitly due to algebraic complexity,
the latter part of this section offers some numerical examples of comparative statics
that serve as reference for the true range of the parameter space. Overall speaking,
sufficiently high refinancing costs are required for the conclusion in Proposition 3.2.1
to hold, but such requirement is found numerically plausible and is largely consistent
with what we observe for most emerging economies.
3.2.2 Aggregate Savings Rate
In addition to equilibrium asset price, the closed form distribution of firm wealth
allows me to calculate the aggregate savings rate and derive the conditions under
which a savings glut can occur. Aggregate savings rate is defined as the proportion
of wealth not consumed out of the total social wealth which equals the sum of two
parts: the total value of assets, EpW q, and the total value of consumption produced
by the assets. In autarky, the only asset is land, and total consumption equals µ
given no aggregate shock. The aggregate savings rate
SA ” EpW q
µ` EpW q . (3.11)
70
After financial integration, total consumption equals µ` rp1´αqEpW q, where rp1´
αqEpW q corresponds to the amount of interest earned from risk free bonds. The
aggregate saving rate
SI ” EpW q
µ` p1` rp1´ αqqEpW q . (3.12)
Both (3.11) and (3.12) can be computed given the value of EpW q and α from
the previous section. A savings glut is defined as SI ą SA, that is, savings rate after
financial integration exceeds that under autarky. The following proposition gives a
sufficient condition for a savings glut:
Proposition 3.2.2. (Savings Glut) Defining
p1` ζqr ă 4µ
as Condition 2, then under Conditions 1 and 2
SI ą SA .
The intuition behind Proposition 3.2.2 follows closely from the intuition of Propo-
sition 3.2.1 in that the savings glut also arises from the dominating wealth effect of
introducing risk free assets into firms’ portfolios. Assume, for a moment, that r is
small, such that total consumption before and after financial integration stays rough-
ly the same. From its definition, it is clear that the savings rate is higher if the total
value of assets EpW q is higher. Given the satisfaction of Condition 1, Proposition
3.2.1 implies that P I ą PA, which further implies that EIpW q ą EApW q, since land
value represents the total value of assets in autarky but only a fraction of that under
financial integration. The increase in total asset value results directly from the more
left-skewed steady state distribution of firm net worth, which is the wealth effect
discussed following Proposition 3.2.1.
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Condition 2 is necessary for Proposition 3.2.2 in addition to Condition 1 to ensure
that the increase in asset value exceeds the increase in consumption, which takes the
form of interest rate payments for the risk free bonds. Intuitively, in order for the
additional consumption to be small, the return from risk free bonds, r, cannot be
too high compared to the return from land, µ. Condition 2 gives the quantitative
relationship that the two parameters need to satisfy. Furthermore, the return from
the two assets play different roles in determining land price and the savings rate. For
land price, the smaller r relative to µ, the weaker substitution effect between land
and risk free bonds, as the demand for risk free bonds is lower. For the savings rate,
smaller r implies a more dominating effect of the change in net worth distribution
and total asset value relative to the change in total consumption, which is necessary
for a savings glut to emerge.
Condition 2 and Condition 1 can be satisfied simultaneously. Fixing µ, r and ζ
such that Condition 2 is met, there is always some φ large enough such that Condition
1 is also met. This again highlights the important role of substantial refinancing costs
in this model. However, it is equally important to keep in mind that for analytical
tractability, Proposition 3.2.2 is derived under the validity of Proposition 3.2.1—
potentially a very limited area in the entire space of the necessary and sufficient
conditions. Comparative statics in the latter part of this section shows a much
broader space of parameters in which Proposition 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 both hold.
The demand for foreign risk free assets in this model is akin to that in other
studies such as Mendoza et al. (2009) and Maggiori (2012), which also feature en-
dogenous change in savings rate after financial integration. In Mendoza et al. (2009),
an emerging country and a developed country differ in the completeness of their do-
mestic markets: the emerging country is not able to trade contingent claims because
of its agents’ ability to falsify their true income, whereas the developed country has
complete credit markets. Although similar to the assumption made in this chapter,
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the key force that determines the change in the savings rate of the emerging country
following the integration of the two economies is the difference in interest rates be-
tween the two economies in autarky. The emerging country has a lower interest rate
and consequently higher asset prices in autarky because its investors have a stronger
motive for precautionary savings. In Maggiori (2012), global financial imbalance is
triggered by the asymmetry in risk aversion between the developed country (US) and
the emerging economy (rest of the world, ROW). Intermediaries in the ROW face a
non-negative equity constraint while the US intermediaries do not, making the latter
better at absorbing investment risk. As a result the US holds most of the risky assets
in the world and the ROW mostly risk free debt issued by the US intermediaries. In
both of these studies and in this paper, agents of the emerging economy have strong
precautionary savings motive since they cannot completely hedge investment risk
due to their domestic market frictions. This precautionary savings motive increases
the aggregate savings rate of the emerging economy once foreign supplies of risk free
assets become available.
This paper differs from existing studies in the mechanism that jointly determines
both asset prices and savings rate. Aside from the precautionary savings motive
raising the demand for risk free assets, existing studies usually also predict less
demand for domestic risky assets from the investors of emerging economies who
substitute risky assets for risk free assets. In contrast, this chapter argues that in
addition to the substitution effect of higher precautionary savings through risk free
assets, there is also a wealth effect that can dominate as long as domestic firms are
sufficiently risk averse. A dominating wealth effect pushes up both the price of the
domestic risky asset as well as the overall value of firm wealth.
Conclusions in this chapter contribute to the debate over whether foreign direct
investment (FDI) is the major factor responsible for the asset price booms in some
emerging economies during the 1990s. The existing literature predicts that as do-
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mestic investors substitute domestic risky assets with foreign risk free assets, the
domestic risky assets are usually being held in the form of FDI by foreign investors,
who have the comparative advantage of making risky investments due to a more
developed financial market. The price of domestic risky assets increases only if the
demand through FDI exceeds the supply due to the substitution effect. However,
despite the FDI’s rapid growth in many emerging economies, it is still considerably
smaller than the domestic investment. This chapter casts doubt on FDI as the ma-
jor cause for domestic asset price increase by showing that asset price booms can
emerge solely as a result of increased domestic demand. This sounds a caveat to
policy makers who aim at regulating FDI for the purpose of decelerating asset price
booms.
This model also generates an endogenous liquidity glut, a concept proposed by
Rajan (2006b), who argues that excessive liquidity and shortage of physical asset in
many emerging economies contribute significantly to their asset price booms. Advo-
cators of the liquidity glut theory usually attribute excessive liquidity to imbalanced
growth between production and investment. However, such argument is controversial
given the rapid industrialization in several emerging economies. 6 In contrast, this
chapter predicts that more wealth can be invested in the domestic physical asset,
land, when the wealth effect of financial integration dominates. Excessive liquidity
can rise endogenously due to precautionary savings and reduced overall investment
risk.
The stationary distribution of firms’ wealth in this model, given by equation
(3.10), takes the form of a power function. This provides an potential explanation
for the cross-sectional distribution of firm size, which likewise closely resembles a
power function. Ai et al. (2012) calculate that the number of Compustat firms
6 For example, the investment rate in China post the 1992 economic reform is maintained around
39 percent accordingly to Song et al. (2012)
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with more than N employees is roughly N´1.06. They establish a theory featuring
such power distribution of firm size by explicitly modeling agency frictions. In the
model of this chapter, Wt which measures the value of firms’ total assets can be
naturally interpreted as firm size. Wt follows a power distribution in the steady
state equilibrium in this model because of the stationary distribution of a reflected
geometric Brownian motion. Although built intentionally for emerging economies,
the model in this chapter can potentially be calibrated to fit the US data as well.
Note that while imperfect market is crucial for the asset price and savings rate
movements to be consistent with observation, such assumption is not essential for
a power function form of stationary distribution, which only requires a geometric
Brownian motion with two reflecting barriers.
3.2.3 Comparative Statics
How do land price and savings rate react to exogenous changes in productivity,
international interest rate, or financing costs? In this section I study the comparative
statics of several exogenous variables through numerical simulations.7 The variation
in exogenous variables can be interpreted as unexpected aggregate shocks or sudden
regulatory changes. Comparative statics serve as a first step for further investigation
of those regulatory changes and provide a reference for the parameter space for the
main propositions above.
I consider four parameters that generate the most interesting implications from
this model: the expected return of land, µ; the variance of the return on land, σ; the
interest rate r of risk free bonds; and the marginal cost of raising new equity, ξ. For
each parameter, I illustrate equilibrium land prices P I and PA and their differences,
savings rates SI and SA and their differences, firms’ effective degree of risk aversion
7 Although analytical sufficient conditions can be derived for some parameters, they are in general
overly restrictive and difficult to interpret.
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βI and βA and their differences, and portfolio choice α.
Return of the Domestic Asset
I first consider comparative statics for µ, the expected return from investing in land.
Figure 4 shows the equilibrium prices of land, P I and PA, as functions of µ. Both PA
and P I are increasing functions in µ, which is very intuitive: higher expected return
makes land more valuable in both autarky and financial integration. The difference
between P I and PA is always positive, indicating the robustness of Proposition 3.2.1,
which is analytically derived under sufficient conditions only.
Figure 4 also shows the difference between P I and PA diminishing as µ becomes
larger, an interesting observation illustrating the joint effect of the two major forces
driving land price in this model: the substitution effect and the wealth effect of in-
troducing risk free bonds. A more intuitive reading of Figure 4 in understanding this
joint effect is that the difference between P I and PA expands as µ becomes smaller.
On the one hand, the substitution effect is stronger for smaller µ. This is shown in
Panel D of Figure 4, where the portfolio weight of land, α, is an increasing function in
µ. On the other hand, return on land changes firms’ degrees of risk aversion βA and
βI , leading to different valuation of land in equilibrium. As Panel C demonstrates,
βA rises significantly as µ becomes smaller, while βI stays relatively flat. This shows
that firms are much more risk averse when µ is low, which decreases their valuation
of land. This is intuitive in that a lower µ makes it easier to reach the refinancing
boundary. Altogether, the difference in land price before and after financial integra-
tion suggests a dominating wealth effect when µ is small, the conclusion drawn in
Proposition 3.2.1.
Figure 4 also shows the pattern in the savings rate. Consistent with Proposition
3.2.2, Panel B shows that the savings rate is always higher after financial integration.
However, the bigger the µ, the smaller the difference, as SA is an increasing function
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in µ. This is again evidence of a dominating wealth effect, which increases the total
asset value, EpW q, in the savings rate equation (3.11). Just as in the case of land
price, µ has little effect on the post financial integration savings rate. This is because
return on the risky asset matters less to firms when risk free precautionary savings
are available.
Risk of the Domestic Asset
The second parameter explored here is σ: the return volatility of land which measures
the risk of domestic investment. The value of this parameter is closely related to
financial stability and business cycles, which can fluctuate quite dramatically in
many emerging economies. Figure 5 illustrates the effect on land price and savings
rate of changing σ. Both P I and PA are lower when σ is larger, as investing in a more
risky asset requires a higher premium. At the same time, SI and SA move in opposite
directions. As a higher risk of land in autarky naturally implies lower savings through
land, the increasing risk also reinforces the precautionary savings motive, increasing
savings under financial integration when the risk free asset becomes available.
Panel D in Figure 5 shows that α drops significantly when σ increases. The decline
in α can be viewed as an “investment slump”, that is, a protracted decline in physical
investments observed for many of emerging economies that experience savings gluts.
Existing studies on this phenomenon, for example Kramer (2006) and IMF (2007),
attribute to it the observed direction of global capital flows. However, these studies
normally exclude countries without an open market, such as China, and usually also
predict a slump in the domestic asset prices. The result in this section not only shows
that a slump in domestic investment can follow from increased investment risk but
also that it can trigger asset price booms if a country simultaneously opens up its
financial market.
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Risk Free Interest Rate
Next I consider the risk free interest rate r. Recall that risk free bonds are supplied in
the international market by foreign issuers. Domestic firms are price takers and their
investments have no effect on the return of those bonds. However, the international
bond market is by no means stable. It is constantly being affected by the national
credit status and unexpected extreme events. Caballero et al. (2008) find that the
global risk free interest rate has been declining since the 1980s. However, they focus
only the impact on the US market. The comparative statics in this part provide, for
the first time, theoretical predictions on the dynamics of asset price and savings rate
for emerging markets as they experience global interest rate changes.
Figure 6 plots land price and savings rate as functions of r. PA, SA, and βA
are constant in r which has no effect on the variables in autarky. Meanwhile, P I
increases in r, a result of two effects working against each other: on the one hand,
the substitution effect is stronger when r is bigger, which is reflected in the declining
α in Panel D. On the other hand, higher interest rates improve firms’ returns from
precautionary savings, lowering their degree of risk aversion. This is illustrated in
Panel C, where βI declines in r. A similar argument applies to the impact of r
on the savings rate, as shown in Panel B of Figure 6. Savings are increasing in r
after financial integration. According to the savings equation (3.12), higher r implies
higher aggregate consumption but also higher aggregate value of assets held by firms
due to a stronger wealth effect. Savings increasing in r again suggests a dominating
wealth effect.
Refinancing Cost
Last but not least, I demonstrate in Figure 7 the effect of marginal refinancing
cost, ξ, which is the key variable determining the magnitude of wealth effect in this
model. Not surprisingly, P I and PA are decreasing in ξ, because higher refinancing
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costs make firms more risk averse and lower their valuation of the risky asset. The
difference between P I and PA is increasing in ξ because PA drops faster than P I as
refinancing cost increases. This result can be predicted by Condition 1 and 2, the
sufficient conditions under which Proposition 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 are derived, as higher
refinancing costs make those conditions easier to satisfy.
In this section’s discussion of comparative statics, parameter values given in Fig-
ure 2 are used as the benchmark. These numbers are largely consistent with standard
investment models, such as Bolton et al. (2013), but subject to several minor modi-
fications: I choose higher values for σ and ζ to reflect the fact that in most emerging
economies, domestic investment is highly risky and external financing rather difficult.
3.3 Welfare Analysis
The massive savings through foreign risk free assets in emerging economies have
triggered much political and economical debate over whether they impede domestic
investment and growth. Such debate calls for the study of the welfare implications
of firms’ portfolio choice after financial integration. In the decentralized equilibrium,
firms make portfolio choices between risk free bonds and land, taking land price
as given. Firms do not internalize the impact on land value that their portfolio
choice can have through the aggregate distribution of firm wealth. In a market
with imperfect commitment where market allocation of firm wealth is constrained,
inefficient portfolio choices and suboptimal equilibrium asset prices can arise.
The welfare analysis in this section reveals that decentralized portfolio choices are
indeed inefficient: the socially optimal portfolio places less weight on the domestic
risky asset, land, and more weight on foreign risk free bonds. The socially optimal
equilibrium also displays lower asset price and savings rate under financial integra-
tion, suggesting that the asset price boom and savings glut in Section 4 are too high.
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The socially optimal portfolio choice can be achieved through a tax on land.
3.3.1 The Social Planner’s Problem
I conduct the welfare analysis in a similar manner to Lorenzoni (2008): a social
planner maximing the same objective function as firms must face the same limited
commitment constraint and refinancing cost that firms do. In other words, the social
planner has no power to make either intratemporal or intertemporal resources real-
locations among firms. The only additional power the social planner has is knowing
the relation between portfolio choice and equilibrium asset price, which the social
planner takes into consideration when making his portfolio choice decisions.
The social planner’s value function V pWtq solves the following HJB equation:
ρV pWtq “ max
αtď1
”´ µ
P
´ r
¯
αtWt ` rWt
ı
V 1pWtq ` 1
2
α2t
P 2
σ2W 2t V
2pWtq ,
subject to the dynamics of Wt given by (3.1) and boundary conditions (3.4), (3.5),
and (3.6). Most importantly, the social planner takes into account how equilibrium
land price P is determined. That is, there is one additional constraint to the social
planner’s problem: the market clearing condition,
ż
αtWtdF pW q “ P
The same technique used to solve the firm’s problem in the previous section can
still be applied here. I leave the details of the solution to the appendix and move
directly to the following proposition that summarizes the finding:
Proposition 3.3.1. (Constrained Efficiency) Let α˚ be the solution to the social
planner’s problem. Then, under Condition 1,
α˚ ă αI .
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Proposition 3.3.1 states that the social planner’s optimal portfolio places a smaller
weight on land and a larger weight on risk free bonds relative to firms’ decentralized
decisions. The intuition can be best understood through a reverse argument in
the proof of Proposition 3.2.1 which is detailed in the Appendix. First of all, the
degree of firms’ risk aversion is decreasing in the proportion of wealth allocated to
the risky asset, since risk aversion comes from the concern of hitting the refinancing
boundary and having to costly raise new capital, a portfolio with less weight on land
reduces this probability of refinancing. Mathematically, BβBα ă 0. Secondly, less risk
averse firms value the risky asset more, that is BPBβ ą 0. Altogether, by substituting
some investment in land with investment in risk free bonds, firms place less weight
on land after financial integration. This substitution implies a higher land price
and lower marginal return from land, a pecuniary externality which firms do not
internalize when making decentralized decisions. However, when this externality is
taken into consideration, the social planner is aware of the lower return from land
and consequently allocates more value to the risk free bonds.
The pecuniary externality and inefficient portfolio choice come from a combina-
tion of incomplete market due to limited commitment and anonymous spot trading
of assets. The welfare impact of such a market structure in this chapter resembles
the studies of Kehoe and Levine (1993), Lorenzoni (2008) etc, who find that market
frictions in general lead to inefficient asset allocation and firm behaviors, potentially
causing macroeconomic cycles. In this model, inefficient portfolio choices lead to
suboptimal asset prices and distribution of firm wealth. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006)
show that redistribution of firm wealth is strongly pro-cyclical, whereas the socially
optimal reallocation should be counter-cyclical. The model used in this chapter is
flexible and can be easily modified to incorporate aggregate shocks and to study the
implications for business cycles.
Proposition 3.3.1 sheds light on the ongoing political debate over the appropriate
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level of domestic asset prices in some emerging economies. The increase in asset
prices after financial integration improves overall efficiency compared to autarky, as
the distribution of firm net worth is more skewed to the left and firms are on average
wealthier. However, the level of asset price increase does not achieve efficiency. The
socially optimal portfolio derived in Proposition 3.3.1 invest less proportion in land.
Meanwhile, this also implies a less risky portfolio and hence an even more left-skewed
stationary distribution of firm wealth as well as higher aggregate value of investment
in land. The overall effect on land price depends on the relative strength of these two
opposing forces. The socially optimal land price P ˚ appears lower than P I , because
the effect of less weight on land dominates. This suggests that even though higher
asset prices under financial integration reflect a welfare improvement over autarky,
the degree of such asset price booms is inefficiently high.
The fact that the social planner saves more through foreign risk free assets pro-
vides an explanation to the large holdings of US treasury securities by the government
of many emerging economies, such as China. Such government investment strategy
is highly controversial. Critics disparage the large portion of national wealth, most-
ly procured through the profits of state-owned enterprises, being saved in the form
of foreign debt rather than invested in domestic assets. The analysis in this section
shows that should the government transfer its investment from foreign risk free assets
to domestic risky asset, the price of of domestic assets, such as land, would be even
higher and more inefficient. Acting like a social planner, the government allocates
more resources to holding low-risk sovereign debt because a decentralized economy
would otherwise engage in insufficient precautionary savings.
The use of constrained efficiency refers to the social planner’s limited ability to
make intratemporal or intertemporal reallocation of resources. It was proposed as an
useful tool to study the minimal set of conditions under which competitive allocation
can be improved. It also helps the analysis of various regulatory policies imposed
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under market constraints. Moreover, under the constrained efficiency framework,
interventions aimed at one market (e.g., the asset market) can have important in-
teractions with the equilibrium outcome of other markets. One application of the
welfare analysis, the planner directly intervening in the asset market through taxes
and subsidies, is of particular interest to policymakers and is detailed in the next
section.
3.3.2 Implementing the Social Planner’s Choice
An inefficient decentralized equilibrium naturally leads to the discussion of possible
government policies to restore asset prices and wealth distribution to efficiency. The
most common policy that implements the socially optimal choice in this type of
constrained efficiency model is a tax or subsidy that internalizes the pecuniary effect
of individual firms’ portfolio choices on equilibrium asset prices. Consider a tax τ
which the government imposes on holding land.8 Let αIpτq be firms’ equilibrium
portfolio choice given tax rate τ , the firms’ value function now solves
ρV pWtq “ max
αtď1
”´ µ
P
´ r ´ τ
¯
αtWt ` rWt
ı
V 1pWtq ` 1
2
α2t
P 2
σ2W 2t V
2pWtq . (3.13)
Applying the same technique in Section 3.3 and comparing the solution to the
constrained efficient portfolio choice α˚ in Proposition 3.3.1, I obtain the following
proposition:
Proposition 3.3.2. (Optimal Tax Rate) There exists τ ą 0 such that, under Con-
dition 1, αIpτq “ α˚.
Proposition 3.3.2 is quite intuitive given that the socially optimal portfolio places
less weight on land. As investment in risk free bonds reduces the riskiness of firms’
portfolios, equilibrium price of land increases as a result of a dominating wealth
8 A negative τ can be interpreted as a subsidy.
83
effect, which implies a lower return on land. Firms in the decentralized economy
with anonymous spot trading of assets do not take into account such externality and
hence miscalculate the actual return of land. A tax on land suppresses its demand
and brings the decentralized decision to the socially optimal choice. This tax can be
also be inferred from comparative statics in Section 4.3, where the portfolio weight
on land α is an increasing function in the return of land, µ.
Proposition 3.3.2 offers a recommendation to policymakers of emerging economies
who want to regulate domestic asset prices and savings rate. Public supply can allevi-
ate the problems of competitive equilibrium allocation when the competitive market
is subject to frictions. For emerging economies, the welfare analysis in this section
suggests potentially over-investment in domestic risky assets and under-investment
in precautionary savings. A tax on the risky investment provides a less risky in-
vestment environment and alleviates excessive savings and price booms, improving
overall welfare.
3.4 Heterogenous Firms and Total Factor Productivity
This chapter is motivated by the global financial account imbalance resulting from fi-
nancial integration. Capital flowing from emerging to developed countries represents
asset reallocation via the international market. While cross-country asset realloca-
tion due to financial integration has been discussed extensively by existing studies,
the domestic asset reallocation is less well understood.
This section fills that void by introducing heterogeneity into firms’ productivi-
ty, and reveals how asset reallocation generated by heterogeneous productivity can
amplify asset price booms and savings gluts after financial integration. It also demon-
strates how financial integration improves the aggregate productivity of the economy,
but this improvement has a non-monotonic relationship with the degree of hetero-
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geneity. This produces several testable hypotheses explaining cross-country differ-
ences in asset price and savings rate.
Research has argued heterogeneous productivity and asset allocation to be po-
tentially important determinants of many economic indices, especially among emerg-
ing economies. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) find that asset allocation is related
to country specific savings rates. Song et al. (2012) establish a two-sector economy
model, where asset allocation contributes to the level of growth, investment as well as
current account balance. This section extends these studies to financial integration-
induced asset reallocation and demonstrates how it impacts domestic asset prices,
savings rate, and total factor productivity.
3.4.1 Heterogenous Productivity and Asset Prices
I alter the model to incorporate heterogeneous productivity in the simplest way. Let
dAt “ µsdt`σdZt, where s P pl, hq is a binary state variable denoting firms’ produc-
tivity: either low type µl or high type µh. The distribution of high productivity firm
has measure pi. This simply means that the dynamics of firm wealth is
dWt “ αt
Pt
WtdRs,t ` p1´ αtqWtrdt . (3.14)
In the steady state, firm’s value function follows
ρV pWtq “ max
αtď1
”´µs
P
´ r
¯
αtWt ` rWt
ı
V 1pWtq ` 1
2
α2t
P 2
σ2W 2t V
2pWtq ,
subject to the dynamics of Wt for both types of firms and the same boundary con-
ditions (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6).
At the same time, the market clearing condition becomes
pi
ż
αhWhdFhpW q ` p1´ piq
ż
αlWldFlpW q “ P ,
85
which stems from an aggregate savings in land by both types of firms that equaled
the total value of land.
In this binary state model, the degree of heterogeneity across firms can be mea-
sured by the range of µs. I compute numerical examples of mean-preserving spreads
of µ by setting pi “ 0.5 and increasing µh, while decreasing µl to keep the same
average productivity as in Figure 3. The higher the µh is, the larger the dispersion
of productivity and degree of firm heterogeneity.
Figure 8 shows land prices as a function of productivity heterogeneity. Both PA
and P I decrease as the dispersion of productivity expands. Notice that P I is still
higher than PA, consistent with the prediction in Proposition 3.2.1. However, their
difference increases with higher degree of heterogeneity. That is, heterogeneous pro-
ductivity amplifies the asset price booms resulting from financial integration. Recall
that in Section 5, such booms are inefficiently high, in other words heterogenous
productivity exacerbates the inefficiency.
Compared to the baseline homogenous productivity model, there are two addi-
tional channels through which land price varies with firm heterogeneity: first, where-
as homogenous firms hold the same proportion of risky assets in their portfolios,
heterogenous productivity induces asset reallocation between the two types of firms
with different returns from land. Whether higher returns imply more investment in
land depends on firms’ intertemporal elasticity of substitution which, in this model,
is induced by costly refinancing. Panel B of Figure 8 plots αs, the portfolio weights
on land, for firm type. High productivity firms invest a lower proportion in land than
low productivity firms. Their investment in land is also a decreasing function of pro-
ductivity, implying an elastic intertemporal substitution effect. Higher return from
land increases firms’ willingness to trade future dividend payout for precautionary
savings that lowers investment risks, which also explains why less productive firms
invest more in land.
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The second channel through which heterogeneity affects land prices is change in
firms’ effective degree of risk aversion, which determines the valuation of any risky
asset given its return. Figure 8 shows that under both autarky and financial in-
tegration, firms’ risk aversion coefficient β increases for low productivity firms but
decreases for high productivity firms. In the steady state equilibrium, not only is
there a transfer of shares of land captured by αs across firms with different produc-
tivity levels but also a transfer of firm wealth from low to high productivity firms.
While both types of firms are subject to wealth effect after financial integration, it
is stronger for lower productivity firms as they are more risk averse.
To sum up, introducing firm heterogeneity amplifies the boom in land price af-
ter financial integration through the transfer of firm wealth between low and high
productivity firms and asset reallocation, with the latter dominating. The incre-
mental investment in land by low productivity firms cannot offset the reduction in
investment by high productivity firms, lowering the aggregate value invested in land.
Heterogeneous productivity also amplifies the savings glut, as shown by Figure
9. The breakdown of savings for low and high productivity firms is also shown. The
trends in savings follow closely those of βs: high productivity firms save less than
low productivity firms, and their savings also decrease in productivity. The same
intuition for elastic intertemporal substitution applies here as well. Savings decrease
faster in productivity under autarky than under financial integration, because firms
are more risk averse in the former equilibrium. As heterogeneity grows, high pro-
ductivity firms in autarky reduce savings the most, causing a wider gap in aggregate
savings before and after financial integration.
Results in this section regarding heterogeneous productivity provide the following
empirical predictions: cross-country differences in asset prices and savings rate can be
explained by heterogeneity in countries’ domestic firm productivity, and even more
so by the productivity level of the least productive firms. Research has documented
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severe market frictions in many emerging economies that hinder technology diffusion
and create heterogeneity among domestic firms. The same market frictions can also
magnify the growth in asset prices and savings rate once when these economies are
integrated into the global financial market.
3.4.2 Financial Integration and TFP Changes
The effect of heterogeneity on asset prices and the savings rate described in the pre-
vious section stems from asset reallocation in an imperfect market due to financial
frictions, namely, limited commitment and costly financing. With firms now varying
in the level of productivity, the model is equipped to study the implication of het-
erogeneity for aggregate productivity of the economy and answer whether financial
frictions cause asset misallocation, a question heavily debated in literature. On the
one hand, Buera et al. (2011), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Moll (2013) argue that
asset misallocation plays a significant role in explaining cross-sectional productivity
discrepancies among different industries and countries. On the other hand, empiri-
cal studies such as Midrigan and Xu (2011) argue that when matched to micro-level
data, financing friction cannot generate much asset reallocation and hence neither
large cross country differences. In short, there is no consensus on how and to what
extent financial frictions matter for productivity.
I address this question by asking whether financial integration, which improves
the completeness of financial markets by introducing a risk free asset, also improves
the aggregate productivity of the economy. It is straightforward to define total
factor productivity (TFP) for the domestic asset land in this model: since firms with
expected productivity of µs invest αs in land and there is no aggregate shock, TFP
equals total output divided by the quantity of land which is fixed at one unit:
TFP “
ÿ
s“l,h
pis
ż
µs
αs
Pt
WsdFspW q . (3.15)
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In the steady state equilibrium, αs and Pt are constant. In autarky, αs “ 1 for all
firms regardless of their productivity. TFP is simply the average of µs weighted by
the relative distribution of firm wealth.
Figure 10 demonstrates numerical examples of TFP changes following financial
integration as a function of mean preserving productivity spread. Three major ob-
servations can be drawn: first, TFP in both autarky and under financial integration
is decreasing in heterogeneity. Secondly, compared to autarky, TFP is always higher
after financial integration. Thirdly, and most interestingly, the increase in TFP is
non-monotonic in heterogeneity.
The observations drawn from Figure 10 can be explained by two effects of fi-
nancial integration: reallocation of land, and redistribution of firm wealth. Recall
in the previous section, low productivity firms hold more risky assets than the high
productivity firms because of elastic intertemporal substitution. Since more land is
reallocated to low productivity firms, TFP is lower with more heterogeneity. Mean-
while the increase of TFP after financial integration suggests the total wealth high
productivity firms invest in land more than offsets the lower proportion of land held
in their portfolio. The reallocation of land and redistribution of firm wealth work in
opposite directions. Mathematically, both αs and Ws are endogenously determined
in equation (3.15). αh decreases while Wh increases in µh. The combination produces
non-monotonic TFP changes as a function of firm heterogeneity.
This finding sheds light on the mixed empirical evidence for the relationship be-
tween financing frictions and cross-sectional TFP dispersion. Previous research such
as Midrigan and Xu (2011) and Moll (2013) argue that the persistence of productiv-
ity shocks is key to understanding such relationship. More persistent productivity
shocks imply that financial frictions play a less critical role, as firms can better an-
ticipate their future financial need and save accordingly to grow out of their financial
constraint. In this model, productivity is perfectly persistent without any aggregate
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uncertainty, whereas the change of TFP is still non-monotonic in the dispersion of
firm productivity. This implies a more intricate relationship than what has been
proposed so far and warrants future analyses.
3.5 Remarks
Financial integration is important for understanding many market behaviors of e-
merging economies. This chapter provides a model that features endogenous asset
prices and savings rate, and argues that the simultaneous observation of savings g-
luts and asset price booms in emerging economies can be the result of a dominating
wealth effect brought by global financial integration. The critical assumptions are
limited commitment implying incomplete market and costly refinancing which in-
duces firms to balance between risky investment and risk free precautionary savings.
Welfare analysis reveals that firms’ precautionary savings is inefficiently low, leading
to overly inflated asset prices that can also be exacerbated by heterogeneity in firm
productivity.
The model of this chapter can be extended in several ways, the most important
and interesting of which is perhaps calibration using data from emerging economies.
A calibrated model can demonstrate how much of the increase in asset prices and
savings is attributable to the wealth effect highlighted in this model. It is also
interesting and important for obvious policy reasons to calculate the optimal level of
tax be impose in order to implement the socially optimal portfolio choice.
The assumption of fixed asset supply is widely used in micro-founded asset pricing
models. Thought it allows analytical tractability, the model necessarily becomes
silent on capital reproduction. However, the dynamics of capital reproduction can
shed light on the credit cycles of emerging economies during their development, which
would certainly be interesting for future study.
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Appendix A
Proofs
A.1 Proofs for Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 2.2.1: This optimality condition for a single state envi-
ronment is identical to the baseline model in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) if the
commitment constraint V 2pW q ě L is not binding, so I will only focus on the case
when such condition is violated. I use superscript L to denote variables and functions
for the limited commitment case.
Define the social benefit function as F pW q “ W ` V pW q, which satisfies
F 2pW q “ rF pW q ` pγ ´ rqW ´ µ1
2
λ2σ2s
.
When the principal’s participation constraint is binding, FLpW q “ L `WL im-
plying
FL2pWLq “ rL` γW
L ´ µ
1
2
λ2σ2s
.
Suppose FL2pWLq ą 0, that is, rL ` γWL ą µ, this implies that V L2pWLq ą 0.
Since V LpWLq “ L, rV LpW q ` γWL ą µ. Compare this result to the case of full
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commitment, where rV pW q ` γW “ µ. If WL ă W , since rV pW q ` γW ă µ for all
W ă W , it must be that rV pWLq ` γWL ă µ, which implies V pWLq ă V LpWLq.
However this is a contradiction since V pW q ě V LpW q for every W . If, on the other
hand, W
L ą W , but V LpWLq “ L and V pW q ă L, which implies that V LpWLq ą
V pWLq again, contradiction. Therefore FL2pW q ă 0 in the neighbourhood of WL.
The rest of the argument about FL being also concave besides the neighbourhood
of W
L
follows the standard argument. The proof also implies immediately that
rV LpW q ` γW ď µ for all W if the boundary condition V L2pWLq “ L is true. This
conclusion is used in the following verification theorem.
Verification Theorem: for any incentive compatible contract, define an auxil-
iary gain process G as
Gt “
ż t
0
e´rspdYs ´ dIsq ` e´rtV pWtq ,
where Wt evolves according to dWt. By Ito’s lemma
ertGt “
ˆ
µ` γWtV 1pWtq ` 1
2
β2t σ
2V 2pWtq ´ rV pWtq
˙
dt
´p1` V 1pWtqqdIt ` p1` βtV pWtqqσdZt .
The first two terms are negative and therefore Gt is a supermartingale. Now evalu-
ating the principal’s payoff for this contract
E
„ż τ
0
e´rspdYs ´ dIsq ` e´rτL

“
E pGtˆτ q ` e´rτE
„
1ttďτu
ˆ
Et
ˆż τ
t
e´rps´tqpdYs ´ dIsq ` e´rpτ´tqL
˙
´ V pWtq
˙
.
First, EpGtˆτ q ď G0 since Gt is a supermartingale. Then, Etp
şτ
t
e´rspdYs´ dIsq`
e´rtLq ď µ
r
´Wt, since by the argument above, rV pW q`γW ď µ for all W . Letting
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tÑ 8 implies that
E
ˆż τ
0
e´rspdYs ´ dIsq ` e´rτL
˙
ď V0pW q .
˝
Proof of Corollary 2.2.1:The relationship between V pW q and V LpW q is fairly
straightforward: if V LpW q ą V pW q instead, then V pW q cannot be the optimal value
function for the principal since the contracting space with the commitment constraint
is a strict subset of the contracting space without the constraint.The relationship
between W and W
L
follows that rV pW q ` γW “ µ and rV pWLq ` γWL ď µ and
the inequality is strict whenever V pW q ă L˝
Proof of Proposition 2.3.1: Since the high volatility state is assumed a ab-
sorbing state, the value function in such state follows directly from Proposition 2.2.1.
The optimality conditions for the low volatility state can be proved in a very similar
manner as that in Proposition 2.2.1. Differentiate the corresponding social benefit
function with respect to W , substituting in the boundary conditions and evaluating
the equation at the payment boundary WL implies
F3l pW lq “
pγ ´ rq ` `γW l ´ pilδlpWLq˘F 2l pW lq
1
2
λ2σ2l
,
where F 2l pWlq is given by
F 2l pW lq “
rFlpW lq ` pγ ´ rqW l ´ µ` pil
`
FhpW l ` δlpW lqq ´ FlpW lq
˘
1
2
λ2σ2l
.
Piskorski and Tchistyi (2010) show the optimality conditions for the full com-
mitment case. Under limited commitment, if the commitment constraint is not
binding in the low volatility state, the proof is identical to theirs. Now suppose
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it is binding, which implies that it must also be binding in the high volatility s-
tate. Given the fact that V L1l pWLl q “ V L1h pWLh q “ ´1, the slope matching procedure
that pins down δ implies δLl pWLl q “ WLh ´WLl , Given that rFLl pWLl q ` γWLl ă µ
from Corollary 1, if W
L
h ă WLl , then δLl pWLl q ă 0, and FL3l pWLl q ą 0. If WLh ą
W
L
l , then γW
L
l ´ pilδLl pWLl q ą 0 as pil ă γW
L
l
δLl pW
L
l q
. Since δLl pWLl q ă WLh ă µ´rLγ ,
γW
L
l ´ pilδLl pWLl q ą 0 as long as pil ă W
L
l
µ´rL . Note that for a non trivial contract,
W
L
l ą R “ 0, there is always pil small enough such that pil ă Rµ´rL is satisfied. The
subsequent verification is similar to that used in Piskorski and Tchistyi (2010) thus
is omitted here.˝
Proof of Corollary 2.3.1: From Corollary 1 and Proposition 2, VhpW q ă VlpW q
and V Lh pW q ă V Ll pW qfor all W ą R. For the full commitment contract, V 2l pW lq “
V 2h pW hq “ 0 implies rVspW sq`γW s for s “ l, h, then Corollary 1 implies W l ă W h.
For the limited commitment contract, V Ll pWLl q “ V Lh pWLh q “ L and V 1s pW q ă 0 near
the payment boundary implies W
L
l ą WLh˝
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2: This proposition is proved in two steps. First,
I show that both V 1l and V 1h are convex functions at the payment boundary. This
conclusion utilizes the concavity of the value function which is true for both full
commitment and limited commitment so only the former is shown. Differentiate the
principal’s HJB equation with respect to W , and substituting in V 1hpW ` δlpW qq “
V 1hpW q, a condition that is always satisfied around the neighbourhood of the payment
boundary because V 1s pW q “ ´1 regardless of state and contract type. This yields
rV 1s pW q “ pγW ´ pisδspW qqV 2s pW q ` 12λ
2σ2sV
3
s pW q ` pγ ´ pisδ1spW qqV 1s pW q .
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Evaluating this at the payment boundary in the high volatility state yields
V 3h pW hq “ pγ ´ rq ´ γW hV
2
h pW hq
1
2
λ2σ2h
ą 0 ,
since V 2h pW hq ď 0. Similarly,
V 3l pW lq “ pγ ´ rq ´ γW lV
2
l pW lq ` pilXpW lq
1
2
λ2σ2l
,
where
XpW lq “ δ1lpW lqV 1l pW lq ` δlpW lqV 2l pW lq .
Letting piL Ñ 0 yields
V 3l pW lq “ pγ ´ rq ´ γW lV
2
l pW lq
1
2
λ2σ2l
ą 0 .
Therefore V 3l pW lq ą 0 for small enough pil, and both V 1l and V 1h are convex functions
at the payment boundary. The same argument applies for the limited commitment
contract.
The second step compares the variation of δ near the payment boundary. Consider
the full commitment contract: by Corollary 1, VhpW q ă VlpW q and VhpRq “ VlpRq “
L implies V 1hpRq ă V 1l pRq. Since V 1hpW hq “ V 1l pW lq “ ´1, there must exist xW such
that V 1hpxW q “ V 1l pxW q. Moreover, W h ą W l by Corollary 2.3.1 and, because V 1s are
convex functions, there is a unique xW after which δlpW q ą 0 for all W ą xW .
For the limited commitment contract, V L1h pRq ă V L1l pRq, V L1h pWLh q “ V L1l pWLl q “
´1 and WLh ă WLl by Corollary 2 implies there exists xWL such that δLl pW q ą 0 for
all W ą xWL Let xW be the largest between the two cut-offs for the full and limited
commitment contract, and note that xW ă WLl since δLl pWLl q ă 0 and δlpW lq ą 0
proves this proposition.˝
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Proof of Corollary 2.3.2
Define ∆pW q “ `W h ´ pW ` δlpW qq˘ ´ `W l ´W˘ as the difference between
the distances to the payment boundary before and after the uncertainty shock for
the full commitment contract, and ∆LpW q as the same distance but for the limit-
ed commitment contract. Then ∆LpW q ´ ∆pW q “
´
W
L
h ´W h
¯
´
´
W
L
l ´W l
¯
´`
δLl pW q ´ δlpW q
˘
. For small pil, W
L
l ´W l is small. Therefore ∆LpW q ´∆pW q ă 0
as long as W
L
h ´ δLl pW q ă W h´ δLpW q. Notice that W h´WLh “ δLpW lq ´ δLl pWLl q,
and δ1lpW lq ą 0 while δL1l pWLl q ă 0 by Proposition 3. Therefore δlpW q ´ δLl pW q ă
δlpW lq ´ δLl pWLl q “ W h ´WLh for any W ą xW . That is, ∆LpW q ´∆pW q ă 0 for all
W ą xW .˝
Proof of Proposition 2.3.3: Following Cox and Miller (1977), the transition
density of the process W in the high variance state given initial value Wt` follows
the Kolmogorov forward equation:
B
Btfpt,W ;Wt`q “
1
2
B2
BW 2
“
λ2σ2hfpt,W ;Wt`q
‰´ BBW rγWfpt,W ;Wt`qs ,
subject to the boundary conditions
fpt, 0;Wt`q “ 0
1
2
B
BW
“
λ2σ2hfpt,W ;Wt`q
‰ |W“Wh ´ γW hfpt,W h;Wt`q “ 0 ,
where f is a density function conditional on Wt` “ W .
Define σ2 “ λ2σ2h as the overall variance of the W process. Let fγ be the solution
to this boundary value problem for a particular γ. According to Ward and Glynn
(2003), when γ is closer to zero, fγ can be approximated by
fγpt,W ;Wt`q “ kpγqgpt,W ;Wt`q ` opγq , (A.1)
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where kpγq “ `1´ γ
2σ2
W 2t` ` γ2σ2W 2 ` γ2 t
˘
and g is the corresponding transition den-
sity function for the same process but with γ “ 0.
Now the problem becomes a Brownian motion between an absorbing and a re-
flecting barrier. In particular, gpt,W ;Wt`q satisfies the differential equation:
B
Btgpt,W ;Wt`q “
1
2
B2
BW 2
“
σ2gpt,W ;Wt`q
‰
,
subject to boundary conditions gpt, R;Wt`q “ 0, 12σ2 BBW rgpt,W ;Wt`qs|W“Wh “ 0.
The solution to this problem has been derived by Schwarz (1992) as
gpW, tq “
8ÿ
n“1
An exp
ˆ
´α2n12σ
2t
˙
cos pαnW q ,
where αn “ p2n´1qpi2Wh and An “
cospαnWt`q
Wh
.
Substituting this into the approximation function (A.1) yields fpW, tq which can
be used in the definition of the expected local time at the payment boundary
E rLhpT ;Wt`qs “ lim
εÑ0
1
2ε
ż T
0
dt
ż Wh`ε
Wh´ε
fpt,W ;Wt`qdW
Fixed some Wt` ă WLh , Let
ErLhpT ;Wt`qs ” ErLhpT ;Wt`q|W hs
be the expected local time given the full commitment value functions and payment
boundaries, and define
ELrLhpT ;Wt`qs ” ErLhpT ;Wt`q|WLh s
be the expectation of local time at the payment boundary under the limited com-
mitment contract. First, BBTErLhpT ;Wt`qs|T“0 ą 0, that is, the expected time spend
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at one point is longer whenever the time interval is longer, in particular when the
time interval expands a small amount from 0. Secondly, such derivative is larger for
smaller W h because for a fixed W , fpW, tq is decreasing in W h. The effect of expand-
ing the time interval is bigger, the shorter distance between Wt` and the reflecting
boundary is. Note that in the case of σ " γ, the approximation adjustment term
hpγq is close to one if W and Wt` are near each other, this implies the most precise
approximation is around the payment boundary, exactly the target of the analysis
given here.
From Corollary 2, W h ą WLh , and ELrLhp0;Wt`qs “ ErLhp0;Wt`qs “ 0 implies
EL rLhpT ;Wt`qs ą E rLhpT ;Wt`qs , as T Ñ 0 .
The expected local time grows faster for closer reflecting boundary near T “ 0. Also
EL rLhpT ;Wt`qs ă E rLhpT ;Wt`qs , as T Ñ 8 ,
which implies there is some pT such that
EL
”
LhppT ;Wt`qı “ E ”LhppT ;Wt`qı ,
and
EL rLhpT ;Wt`qs ą E rLhpT ;Wt`qs , for all 0 ă T ă pT .
Finally, notice that givenW h, E rLhpT ;Wt`qs is decreasing inWt` , that is, the further
Wt` is from the reflecting barrier, the less time it spends there within a certain time.
Therefore EL
“LhpT ;WLt`q‰ ą E rLhpT ;Wt`qs as long as WLh ´ WLt` ă W h ´ Wt` .
By Corollary 3 W
L
l ´WLt` ă W h ´Wt` , if Wt´ ą xW , therefore EL rLhpT ;Wt´qs ą
E rLhpT ;Wt´qs for all 0 ă T ă pT as long as Wt´ ą xW˝
Proof of Proposition 2.3.4: Consider the process of W in the high volatility
state with initial positionWt` . LetN be the number of timesW reaches the reflecting
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boundary W h before it is stopped. Then
E rτ s “
8ÿ
i“0
E rτ,N “ is .
First consider N ě 1, if W reaches W h at least once before it is stopped, then
starting from W h, the expected stopping time is smaller whenever W h ´ R is a
shorter interval. Next consider the case M “ 0, the expected stopping time is
smaller whenever Wt` is closer to R. Finally, the average speed of growth of W , γW ,
is slower for smaller W . From Corollary 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 it can be concluded that
EL rτhs ă E rτhsbecause WLh ă W h and WLt` ă Wt` for the same Wt´ .
Same comparison can be conducted between EL rτhs and EL rτls. The expected
stopping time is smaller when W and the initial W is closer to R, and when σ is
larger.
The exact value of E rτ s is difficult to compute due to the irregular process W
follows. However, when γ is small, the same approximation method used in the
proof of Proposition 2.3.3 can be applied here as well. The problem thus becomes a
standard absorbing time question for a Brownian motion between an absorbing and
a reflecting barrier, whose solution is given by Cox and Miller (1977) as
E rτ s “ Wt`p2W h ´Wt`q
σ2
This solution confirms that E rτ s is positively related to W h and Wt` while negatively
related to σ. Since W
L
h ă WLl ă W h, WLt` ă WLt´ ă Wt` , and σh ą σl, EL rτhs must
be the smallest compare to E rτhs and EL rτls ˝
Proof of Proposition 2.4.1:
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Without loss of generality, assume that the interest rate of the credit line is γ.
Begin with the high volatility state σh, Then the credit line balance evolves according
to:
dMt “ γMtdt` xdt` dDivt ´ dYt (A.2)
where Divt represents the cumulative dividends paid by the firm and x is the consol
bond rate. Using the fact that x “ rDt and substituting that into equation (A.2)
implies:
dWt “ ´λdMt “ ´λγMtdt´ λxdt´ λdDivt ` λdYt
“ γWtdt´ λdIt ` λpdYt ´ µdtq
satisfying incentive compatibility. The argument for state σL can be made analogous-
ly subject to a jump δL, whose value is pinned by the matching first order derivatives
procedure˝
Proof of Proposition 2.4.2:
This Proposition is a natural extension given the proofs of Proposition 1 and 2.
The exact conditions under which shirking forever is optimal can be found in Zhu
(2013)˝
A.2 Proofs for Chapter 3
In this appendix I first detail the system of equations that characterize land price P
and firm’s portfolio choice α.
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Financial Integration: in this equilibrium, firms choose optimal portfolio accord-
ing to
α “ µP ´ rP
2
βσ2
(A.3)
firms’ net worth follows a geometric Brownian motion:
dWt
Wt
“
«
pµ´ rP q2
βσ2
` r
ff
dt`
µ
P
´ r
βp σ
P
q dZt
Define λ “ µ´rP
σ
as the Sharp ratio from investing in land, obviously λ must be
larger than 0 in equilibrium, otherwise firms will hold risk free bonds only. Substi-
tuting λ into the dynamics of firm net worth yields
dWt
Wt
“
„
λ2
β
` r

dt` λ
β
dZt (A.4)
Combine (A.3) and (A.4) into firm’s value function yields
ρV “
ˆ
λ2
2β
` r
˙
WtV
1pWtq
The solution is V pWtq “ C1W γ, where γ “ ρ
´
λ2
2β
` r
¯´1 “ 2ρβ
λ2`2rβ . The coef-
ficient C1 and payout boundary can be pinned down by matching the refinancing
boundary condition: V 1pW q “ γC1W γ´1 “ 1`ζ and the payout boundary condition
V 1pW q “ γC1W γ´1 “ 1.
C1 “ 1` ζ
γ
W 1´γ
W “ p1` ξq 11´γ W
For the refinancing boundary W , Substituting V pW q “ C1W γ into boundary
condition (3.6) yields
Cγ1W “ φ` p1` ζqW
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and
γCγ´11 W “ 1` ζ
together one can solve for W
W “ γφp1´ γqp1` ζq
Notice that β ” ´WV 2pWtq
V 1pWtq “ 1´ γ, which implies the following relationship
2rβ2 ` “2pρ´ rq ` λ2‰ β ´ λ2 “ 0 (A.5)
Define Φpβ, λ2q as the left hand side (LHS) quadratic function of this equation.
Φ “ 0 thus determines β given λ, or equivalently, given P . The power of the value
function γ is given by γ “ 1´ β.
The geometric Brownian motion dWt
Wt
“ µWdt`σWdZt with two reflecting barriers
W and W has a stationary distribution. Define η “ 2µW
σ2W
, the stationary distribution
is characterized by the density function:
fpW q “ η ´ 1
W
η´1 ´W η´1
W η´2 (A.6)
Finally, P I is the solution to the market clearing condition
αEpW q “ P (A.7)
where
EpW q “ pη ´ 1q
η
´
W
η´1 ´W η´1
¯ `W η ´W η˘
Combining equations (A.3), (A.4), (A.5), and (A.7) solves for P I .
Autarky : in this equilibrium, firms invest all their net worth in land, thus dWt “
1
Pt
WtdAt when Wt is in between the refinancing and payout boundary. The value
function satisfies
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ρV “
ˆ
µ
P
´ βσ
2
2P 2
˙
WtV
1pWtq
Therefore V pWtq “ C1W γ, where γ “ 2ρP 22µP´σ2β P p0, 1q and γ “ 1´ β implies:
σ2β2 ´ “2µP ` σ2‰ β ` 2P pµ´ ρP q “ 0 (A.8)
The dynamics of firm net worth follow another geometric Brownian motion:
dWt
Wt
“ µ
P
dt` σ
P
dZt (A.9)
There is a stationary distribution for Wt whose density function is given by (A.6).
The density function implies the aggregate net worth EpW q which pins down PA
from the solution to the market clearing condition:
EpW q “ P (A.10)
Combining equations (A.8), (A.9), and (A.10) solves for PA.
Proof of Lemma 3.2.1:
Take (A.5) as a function of β, it is obvious that the function has one negative root
and one positive root. The left hand side is smaller that 0 when β “ 0 and larger
than 0 when β “ 1, hence there must be a unique solution β such that 0 ă β ă 1,
which implies 0 ă γ ă 1.
For the autarky equilibrium, notice that µ ´ ρPA ą 0, since µ
ρ
is the price of
capital when σ “ 0, i.e when investment on capital is risk free. The left hand side of
(A.8) is smaller than 0 when β “ 1, therefore (A.8) has one root larger than 1 and
one smaller than 1, that is, there is a unique β such that 0 ă β ă 1.
Proof of Proposition 3.2.1:
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To show the relationship between P I and PA, I start by showing that PA coincide
with the solution of P I when α “ 1. Next, I show that P I is an increasing function
of α. By limited enforcement, α ă 1 in equilibrium under financial integration,
therefore it must be that P I ą PA.
Using equation (A.4), the geometric Brownian motion of firm net worth Wt sat-
isfies:
µW “ λ
2
β
` r
σW “ λ
β
plus the lower boundary W and endogenous upper boundary W pinned down by
matching the boundary conditions. Notice that W is proportional to W , which
is not surprising given the property of power functions. This reduces the ratio of
W
η ´ W η and W η´1 ´ W η´1 into a linear function of W . Using the relationship
between β and λ derived in (A.5), standard algebra yields that the market clearing
condition can be written as:
λ2 ` pr ´ ρq
2 pλ2 ` rβq α “
˜
p1` ξq1` 1β ´ 1
p1` ξq 1β ´ 1
¸
W
Notice that from (A.5), λ2 “ 2rβ2`2pρ´rqβ
1´β , substituting this into the simplified market
clearing condition yields:
2pr ´ ρq ´ 2rβ2 ` p1´ ρqpβ ´ 1q
4pr ´ ρq ´ 2rβ2 ´ 2rβ α ´
˜
p1` ξq1` 1β ´ 1
p1` ξq 1β ´ 1
¸
W “ 0
Define the left hand side of this equation as Ψpβ, αq, which is now only a function
of two variables: firms’ effective risk aversion β and their portfolio choice α. The fol-
lowing lemma establishes the link between the autarky equilibrium and the financial
integration equilibrium through Ψpβ, αq:
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Lemma A1: PA is the solution to Ψpβ, 1q “ 0
Proof : Let α “ 1, then 1 “ µP´rP 2
βσ2
implies r “ µP´βσ2
P 2
. Plugging this back
into (A.5) implies 2ρP 2 ´ 2µp1 ´ βqP ` σ2βp1 ´ βq “ 0, which, after rearranging
terms, is the same as equation (A.8). Substituting equation (A.8) into (A.4) yields
µW “ µP and σW “ σP for the geometric Brownian motion of the dynamics of Wt
which is identical to dWt under autarky. Notice that EpW q is defined through η as
a function of µW and σW only, this implies that the market clearing condition (A.7)
when α “ 1 is identical to the market clearing condition for the autarky equilibrium,
therefore PA must equal to P I when α “ 1˝
Now comparing P I and PA is equal to comparing the the different solution of
Ψpβ, αq “ 0 in terms of β and α. By the chain rule, BPBα “ BPBβ ¨ BλBα . Signs of the two
terms can be determined separately in the following two lemmas:
Lemma A2: BPBβ ă 0
Proof: By the chain rule,BPBβ “ BPBλ ¨ Bλβ . The definition of λ “ µ´rPσ impliesBPBλ ă
0. Rearranging the terms of equation (A.5) yields λ2 “ 2pr´ρq´2rβ2
β´1 , and
Bλ
Bβ “
1
2
λ
”
2pρ´rβq
pβ´1q2
ı´ 1
2 ą 0, since ρ ą r and β ă 1. Therefore BPBβ ă 0.˝
Lemma A3: BβBα ą 0 under certain parameter conditions
Proof: from Ψpβ, αq “ 0 one can solve α as a function of β:
α “ 2
˜
p1` ξq1` 1β ´ 1
p1` ξq 1β ´ 1
¸
4pr ´ ρq ´ 2rβ2 ´ 2rβ
2pr ´ ρq ´ 2rβ2 ` p1´ ρqpβ ´ 1qW
Taking logarithm on both side of the equation:
lnα “ ln 2W ` ln
´
p1` ξq1` 1β ´ 1
¯
´ ln
´
p1` ξq 1β ´ 1
¯
` lnpλ2`rβq´ lnpλ2`pr´ρqq
Differentiate this equation with respect to β yields:
Bα
Bβ “ A`B ` C
105
where
A “ p1` 1{βqφ p1` ξq
1{β
p1` ξq1` 1β ´ 1
` p1{βq p1` ξq
´1{β
p1` ξq 1β ´ 1
B “ L` r
λ2 ` rβ
C “ L
λ2 ` pr ´ ρq
and L ” BBβ pλ2q
There are three parts that characterize the derivative of α on β: Part A measures
the change of payment boundary W , this term is positive because lower β implies
weaker risk aversion which lowers the payment boundary. Part B comes from the
change of η due to the drift term µW , which is smaller when α is lower; Part C is
the wealth effect reflected by the change of η due to the diffusion term σW , which is
also smaller when α is lower.
Notice that part A is bounded by:
2φ p1` ξq
p1` ξq2 ´ 1 ´
1
p1` ξq2 ´ p1` ξq “
2φ p1` ξq2 ´ 1
pξ ` 2qpξ ` 1q
Part A reaches this upper bound, defined as A, when β “ 1. A sufficient condition
for BβBα ą 0 is therefore:
Lprβ ` ρ´ rq ´ r
pλ2 ` rβqpλ2 ` pr ´ ρqq ě A (A.11)
First, Apλ2 ` rβqpλ2 ` pr ´ ρqq ď Aλ2pλ2 ` rβq, and L “ BBβ pλ2q “ 2pρ´rβqpβ´1q2 ,
therefore the inequality of (A.11) is true as long as
2pρ´ rβq
pβ ´ 1q2 prβ ` ρ´ rq ď Aλ
2pλ2 ` rβq ` r
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2pρ´ rβqprβ ` ρ´ rq ď Aλ2pλ2 ` rβqpβ ´ 1q2 ` r
2pρ´ rβqprβ ` ρ´ rq ď Ar2pr ´ ρq ´ 2rβ2 ` rβpβ ´ 1q2s
2ρpprβ ` ρ´ rq ď Ar2pr ´ ρq ´ 4rβ2 ` rβs
In every step above, the left hand side is made larger and right hand side made
smaller and by using rβ « 0. Finally, since β ă 1, the last inequality above implies
the following sufficient condition under which BβBα ą 0 is satisfied:
3r ` p2r ´ 1qρ
ρ´ r ď A
Combining Lemma A2 and A3 implies BPBα “ BPBβ ¨ BβBα ă 0. By Lemma A1, PA
coincides with the solution where α “ 1 and α ă 1 in the financial integration
equilibrium, therefore it must be PA ă P I . ˝
Proposition 1 implies the following corollary
Corollary 3.2.1: βIn ă βAu
Proof: From (A.5), β which is a increasing function in λ. λ is a decreasing function
in P. Therefore given PA ă PI this implies βIn ă βAu. This result is intuitive as
precautionary savings with risk free asset implies firms are less risk averse. This
Corollary basically states that the wealth effect comes from the reduction of effective
risk aversion
Proof of Proposition 3.2.2:
Proof: by the definition of savings rate:
SI ” E
IpW q
µ` p1` rp1´ αqqEIpW q
SA ” E
ApW q
µ` EApW q
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Suppose that SI ă SA. Because EIpW q ą EApW q, it must be that:
EIpW q
µ` p1` rp1´ αqqEIpW q ă
EApW q
µ` EApW q
µEIpW q ` EApW qEIpW q ă µEApW q ` p1` rp1´ αqqEIpW qEApW q
That is,
µpEIpW q ´ EApW qq ă rp1´ αqEIpW qEApW q
dividing both sides by EApW q yields
µpE
IpW q
EApW q ´ 1q ă rp1´ αqE
IpW q
First, E
IpW q
EApW q “ P
I
αPA
, therefore µP
I
αPA
ă rp1´ αqEIpW q, that is,
rαp1´ αqEIpW q ą µ
or, EIpW q ą 4µ
r
. Recall that:
EpW q “ pη ´ 1q
η
´
W
η´1 ´W η´1
¯ `W η ´W η˘ ă p1` ξq1` 1β ´ 1
p1` ξq 1β ´ 1
Therefore:
p1` ξq1` 1β ´ 1
p1` ξq 1β ´ 1
ą 4µ
r
.
The left hand side has a minimum 1 ` ζ when β Ñ 0, therefore for SI ă SA a
necessary condition is:
p1` ζqr ą 4µ (A.12)
When condition (A.12) it is violated, SI ă SA cannot be true. i.e. when Condi-
tion 2: p1` ζqr ă 4µ is satisfied, it must be SI ą SA.˝
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Proof of Proposition 3.3.1:
The value function of the social planner’s problem solves:
ρV pWtq “ max
αtď1
”´ µ
P
´ r
¯
αtWt ` rWt
ı
V 1pWtq ` 1
2
α2t
P 2
σ2W 2t V
2pWtq (A.13)
subject to the market clearing condition:
ż
αtWtdF pW q “ P
The market clearing condition implies P “ P pαq as an explicit function of α.
The first order condition of HJB equation (A.13) with respect to α is:
´ µ
P
´ r
¯
WV 1 ´ σ
2
P 2pαqαW
2V 2 ´ µα
P 2
P 1pαqWV 1 ` α
2
P 3
σ2P 1pαq “ 0
The first two terms are the first order derivative of V with respect to α taking
P as a constant. Setting them equal to zero gives αI , the solution of α to the
decentralized economy where firms take the equilibrium price P as given. The third
and fourth terms come from the additional market clearing constraint for solving α˚,
that the social planner’s problem taking into account the effect of choosing α on the
equilibrium price P . Using the same procedure of refinement as Section III, I look
for the solution where V 2 “ ´βV 1
W
for some β. Substituting out V 2 and simplifying
the first order condition implies:
´ µ
P
´ r
¯
´ βσ
2
P 2
α ´ µα
P 2
P 1 ` βα
2
P 3
σ2P 1 “ 0 (A.14)
Let Apαq ” ` µ
P
´ r˘´ βσ2
P 2
α, equation (A.14) defines P 1 as a function of α:
P 1pαq|α“α˚ “ Apα
˚qP 3
α˚pβ˚α˚σ2 ´ µq
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Notice that, ApαIq “ 0 since αI is the solution of setting Apαq “ 0. Suppose
that α˚ ą αI . The proof of Proposition 1 shows that P 1 ă 0 under condition 1,
implying that β˚α˚σ2 ´ µ ă 0. However, from equation (A.8) algebra shows that
βIαI ą µ
σ2
. According to Lemma A3, βα is increasing in α, thus β˚α˚ ą βIαI ą µ
σ2
,
contradiction. It must be that α˚ ă αI˝
Proof of Proposition 3.3.2:
Suppose the government imposes a tax τ on land. Firms value function now
satisfies:
ρV pWtq “ max
αtď1
”´ µ
P
´ r ´ τ
¯
αtWt ` rWt
ı
V 1pWtq ` 1
2
α2t
P 2
σ2W 2t V
2pWtq (A.15)
with the first order condition being:
´ µ
P
´ r ´ τ
¯
WV 1 ´ σ
2
P 2
αW 2V 2 “ 0
Imposing that αt is a constant, this first order condition becomes:
´ µ
P
´ r ´ τ
¯
´ βσ
2
P 2
α “ 0
When αI “ α˚, from the proof of Proposition 3 this implies
´ µ
P
´ r
¯
´ βσ
2
P 2
α ´ µα
P 2
P 1 ` βα
2
P 3
σ2P 1 “ 0
Setting τP
2
βσ2
“ α˚pβ˚α˚σ2 ´ µq yields
τ “ α
P 2
ˆ
βα
P
σ2 ´ µP 1
˙
From the proof of Proposition 3.2.1, P 1pαq ă 0. Therefore τ ą 0 is a subsidy.˝
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Appendix B
Further Discussions
B.1 Recurring States
In the main body of the paper I assume that the transition probability from high to
low uncertainty state pih is zero, that is the crisis state is absorbing. This assump-
tion greatly simplifies the verification of the optimality of the contract provided by
Proposition 2, but is unnecessarily for the results of this paper to hold. In this ap-
pendix I provide a full characterization of the optimal contract when I relax such
assumption. That is, when pih ą 0 and the economy switches between normal and
crisis times stochastically. The following proposition summarizes the result:
Proposition B.1.1. Suppose pil ą 0 and pih ą 0. Let Nt be the total number of state
transitions at time t. The agent’s continuation utility Wt follows
dWt “ γWt ´ dIt ` λpdYt ´ µdtq ` δtpdNt ´ pitdtq; . (B.1)
The optimal contract is a pair of value functions VspW q and payment boundaries
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Ws, s P tl, hu such that
rVspW q “ µ` pγW ´ pisδspW qqV 1s pW q ` 12λ
2σ2sV
2
s pW q
`pis pVpspW ` δspW qq ´ VspW qq , (B.2)
subject to boundary conditions VspRq “ L; V 1s pW sq “ ´1; and
V
2
s pW sq “ 0 ,
where δspW q follows (2.7) and (2.8). If the principal has only limited commitment,
the optimal contract is a pair of value functions V Ls pW q and payment boundaries WLs ,
s P tl, hu, such that V Ls pW q satisfies the same system of ODE (B.2) and boundary
conditions V Ls pRq “ L; V L1s pWLs q “ ´1, and
V L
2
s pWLs q “ 0, if V Ls pWLs q ě L ,
V Ls pWLs q “ L, otherwise .
Proof: the proof builds on iteration procedure described in Li (2012). I therefore
only sketch the argument here in the interest of space. Consider first the case of
full commitment. Applying the martingale method of Sannikov (2008), the agent’s
continuation utility follows (B.1). Ito’s lemma implies that the principal’s HJB
equation satisfies (2.6). Let rVspW q be a solution to (2.6). The concavity of rVspW q
can be shown using the method similar to Proposition 2. Take rVlpW q as given,
define an auxiliary value function USh as the payoff assuming the principal ceases to
provide any incentive to the agent in the high volatility state until the next volatility
shock arrives. The concavity of rVspW q implies that rVhpW q ą USh . Apply the similar
argument to rVlpW q but take rVhpW q as given, Li (2012) shows that the procedure
converges to a pair of function VspW q satisfying equation (B.2). Finally, the same
procedure also applied to the limited commitment contract as long as VspW q remain
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concave, which is shown in Proposition 1 by replacing the VhpW q with rVhpW q in its
proof.˝
The optimal contract characterized under recurring state is qualitatively identical
to the one summarized in Proposition 2 under a one-time shock. In fact, principal’s
value functions of the contract under recurring states converge to value functions
under a one-time shock when pih Ñ 0. Given pis are assumed to be small numbers
the case of a one-time shock provides a good approximation for the general case of
recurring states and does not lose any important result.
All the remaining results discussed in the main body regarding the position of
payment boundaries, the frequency of cash payment and expected termination time
are preserved in the recurring state contract, as long as the parameters are that once
the limited commitment constraint is imposed, it is binding in both states. The
discussion of “pay-for-luck” can be expanded to not only negative shocks but also
positive shocks. The following result can be inferred from Proposition 3: Under the
full commitment contract, managers whose accumulated performance is well enough
receive less utility when volatility decreases; meanwhile managers under the limited
commitment contract receive higher utility. The conclusion for limited commitment
contract is consistent with empirical findings of “pay-for-luck” which further reinforce
the importance of taking firms’ commitment ability into account when understanding
compensation under shocks.
Contracts with Limited Commitment Binding in One State Only
Section 3.1 introduced three types of contracts based on when the limited commit-
ment constraint is binding. While the main text focuses on the third types, here
I also provide some discussions of the second type: the contract where the limit-
ed commitment constraint is binding only in the high volatility state. In general,
this type of contract can behave like contracts with either full commitment or those
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with limited commitment but the commitment constraint is binding in both states,
depending on the parameter value σ in each state.
The main goal of this appendix is to establish conditions under which the main
Propositions in Section 4 are still valid for the optimal contract when the limited
commitment constraint is imposed. The proofs of Proposition 4 reveal that the
key variable driving the dynamics of compensation is the distance between Wt`
and payment boundary W h. This leads to the conjecture that the dynamics of
compensation of the type of contract discussed in this appendix section will be similar
to the dynamics of the limited commitment contracts described in Section 4 as long
as when the commitment constraint is imposed, the agent’s continuation utility Wt`
is closer to the payment boundary W
L
h compared to the full commitment case. Due
to the implicit form of the value function, it is analytically difficult to characterize
the exact range of parameters under which this conjecture is true. Nevertheless the
following proposition gives one sufficient condition for it.
Proposition B.1.2. If the commitment constraint is binding only in the high vari-
ance state, then there exist xW such that WLt` ´WLh ă Wt` ´W h for all Wt´ ą xW
as long as W h ă W l.
Proof: Similar to the proof of Proposition 3 and Corollary 3, consider the full
commitment contract first. VhpW q ă VLpW q implies W h ą W l and V 1hpRq ă V 1l pRq.
Since V 1hpW hq “ V 1l pW lq “ ´1, there must exist xW such that V 1hpxW q “ V 1l pxW q and
δlpW q ą 0 for all W ą xW .
Next, if the limited commitment constraint is imposed and binding, V L1h pRq ă
V L1l pRq, V L1h pWLh q “ V L1l pWLl q “ ´1. If WLh ă WLl , then there exists xWL such
that δLh pW q ą 0 for all W ą xW . Let xW “ max!xW,xWL), then δ1lpW lq ą 0 while
δL1l pWLl q ă 0 for all W ą xW . Finally, define ∆LpWt´q ´∆pWt´q “ ´WLh ´W h¯ ´
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´
W
L
l ´W l
¯
´ `δLl pWt´q ´ δlpWt´q˘. For small pil, WLl ´W l is small. Notice that
W h ´WLh “ δlpW lq ´ δLl pWLl q, δ1lpW lq ą 0 and δL1l pWLl q ă 0 implies δl “ pWt´q ´
δLl pWt´q ă δl “ pW lq ´ δLl pWLl q “ W h “ ´WLh for any Wt´ ą xW . Therefore,
∆LpWt´q ´∆pWt´q ă 0 for all Wt´ ą xW .˝
Given the sufficient condition above, the rest of the analysis follows exactly the
one shown in the main text. Figure C.4 demonstrate the difference between two levels
of volatility in the high volatility state. For the same level of σl, the relative position
of W l and W
L
h are similar to the full commitment case when σh is moderate, but
converge to the case in which the commitment constraint is binding in both states
when σh becomes high enough.
The finding of this section greatly expands the domain of contracts to which
Propositions 4 and 5 can apply. Large bonuses in crisis times could be possible if
the abrupt volatility increase is substantial enough that many firms that operate
smoothly during normal times suddenly become constrained in the amount they
can credibly pledge to pay their managers in the long-run. The greater increase of
market risks during the crises, the more severe is this concern. Future research that
calibrates or empirically investigates the real scope of this commitment constraint
will be helpful in determining the proportion of firms that are subject to limited
commitment contracts and firms whose dynamics of bonuses follow the predictions
in this paper.
Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
A renegotiation-proof contract requires the slope of the principal’s value function to
be non-positive. Such condition is ruled out in the main context of this paper because
V LpRq “ V LpWLq “ L when the limited commitment constraint binds, hence a non-
trivial contract must have a region where the principal’s valuation is increasing in
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the agent’s continuation value W . To allow renegotiation-proof contracts I modify
the assumption about the principal’s commitment ability. I assume that, instead of
having the option to liquidate the project any time during the contract, the principal
will only withdraw the investment when firm values is below zero. This assumption
is similar to the one made by Ai and Li (2013). The corresponding constraint on the
payment boundary is now:
V pW q ě 0 .
The dynamics of the agent’s continuation value under renegotiation-proof contracts
follow
dWt “ γWt ´ dIt ` λpdYt ´ µdtq ` δtpdNt ´ pitdtq ` dPt .
The new term dPt defines a reflecting termination boundary W which satisfies the
boundary condition V pW q “ L and V 1pW q “ 0. Termination is stochastic at this
boundary, with probability dPt
W´Rto account for the extra term on the agent’s contin-
uation value and keep the contract incentive compatible.
For the main results of this paper to carry through, it is sufficient to prove the
following proposition:
Proposition B.1.3. Under the renegotiation-proof contract, W h ą W l under full
commitment and W
L
h ă WLl when the constraint is binding in both states.
Proof: Clearly, Corollary 1 and 2 still apply to renegotiation-proof contracts.
Therefore W
L
h ă WLl since VhpW q ă VlpW q and V pW q “ 0 if the commitment
constraint is binding in both states. Without the constraint the contract is a standard
continuous-time dynamic contract with regime switching, and the argument of the
boundary positions can be found in Hoffmann and Pfeil (2010)˝
Given the relative positions of the payment boundaries for the full commitment
and limited commitment contracts, one can easily see that a statement similar to
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Corollary 3 can be made here as well. Figure C.5 shows the value functions for the
renegotiation-proof contracts, where both the endogenous renegotiation boundaries
as well as the payment boundaries are displayed. The graphs confirms Propositions
regarding the relative positions of payment boundaries for both the full and limited
commitment contracts. Such conclusions leads to the same dynamics of bonuses
payment described in Section 3 and the details are thus omitted here.
Last but not least, renegotiation-proofness is not a necessary feature for the
contract to be optimal despite limited commitment. The principal is still able to
rule out further renegotiation since the only action she cannot commit to is not
to withdraw when firm value is negative. In particular, the principal can commit
to the random termination schedule described above, which is crucial in keeping
the manager’s incentive properly. Further, the assumption of investors withdrawing
their investment when firm value drops below zero replaces the earlier assumption
of liquidation at any time, and therefore the value of the firm at the termination
boundary is still the liquidation value since it is determined by the agent’s effective
limited liability constraint and the principal is able to commit to termination once
that boundary is reached.
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Appendix C
Figures
Panel A. Full Commitment Panel B. Limited Commitment
Figure C.1: Value Functions for the Optimal Contracts
This figure plots firm value functions under regime switching. The full commitment case is shown
in the left panel. The limited commitment case is shown in the right panel. Parameter values are
L “ 20, R “ 0, γ “ 0.04, r “ 0.02, µ “ 1, λ “ 0.1, σl “ 5.9, σh “ 6.5, pil “ 0.001, σh “ 0
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Panel A. Frequency of Payments Panel B. Survival Rate
Figure C.2: Simulation Results
This figure plots the frequency of cash compensation (bonuses) and the fraction of active projects
from simulating 5000 paths of cash flows, Parameter values are the same as those in Figure C.2.
Panel A. Size of δlpW q Panel B. Distance to the Payment Boundary
Figure C.3: Allocation of Agent’s Continuation Utility
This figure plots the size of δl (left panel) and Wh´Wt` (right panel), the distance between agent’s
continuation utility and the payment boundary after the uncertainty shock.
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Panel A. Low σh Panel B. High σh
Figure C.4: Contracts with the Commitment Constraint Binding in One
State Only
This figure plots firm value functions when the limited commitment constraint is binding only in
the high volatility state. Parameter values are the same as those in Figure C.1 except σl “ 5 and
σh “ 6 for the left panel, and σh “ 6.5 for the right panel
Panel A. Full Commitment Panel B. Limited Commitment
Figure C.5: Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
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Figure C.6: Gross Savings Rate (in percentage of GDP)
source: World Bank
Figure C.7: Housing Index, China
source: Wu, Gyourko and Deng (2012)
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Figure C.8: Value Function
This figure shows the value function in autarky (VA) and under financial integration (VI), using
parameters in the following table
ρ r µ σ ξ φ
0.15 0.1 0.15 0.5 0.15 0.1
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A.Asset Prices B.Savings Rate
C.Risk Aversion D.Portfolio Choice
Figure C.9: Comparative Statics: µ
This figure presents the comparative statics of the return on land, µ. The red dotted line indicates
the value in autarky while the blue line indicates the value under financial integration
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A.Asset Prices B.Savings Rate
C.Risk Aversion D.Portfolio Choice
Figure C.10: Comparative Statics: σ
This figure presents the comparative statics of the volatility of return on land, σ. The red dotted
line indicates the value in autarky while the blue line indicates the value under financial integration
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A.Asset Prices B.Savings Rate
C.Risk Aversion D.Portfolio Choice
Figure C.11: Comparative Statics: r
This figure presents the comparative statics of the international risk free interest rate, r. The red
dotted line indicates the value in autarky while the blue line indicates the value under financial
integration
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A.Asset Prices B.Savings Rate
C.Risk Aversion D.Portfolio Choice
Figure C.12: Comparative Statics: ξ
This figure presents the comparative statics of the marginal refinancing cost, ξ. The red dotted line
indicates the value in autarky while the blue line indicates the value under financial integration
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A. Risk Aversion under Autarky B. Risk Aversion under Financial Integration
C. Savings Rate under Autarky D. Savings Rate under Financial Integration
Figure C.13: Heterogenous Productivity, Asset Prices, and Risk Aversion
This figure presents the effect of productivity heterogeneity on land prices. Panel A shows the land
prices under autarky (red dotted) and financial integration (blue). Panel B shows the portfolio
choice α for both low productivity and high productivity firms. Panel C and D shows the degree
of risk aversion
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Figure C.14: Heterogenous Productivity and TFP
This figure presents the effect of productivity heterogeneity on TFP. On the top it shows TFP in
both autarky (red) and financial integration (blue). On the bottom it shows the change of TFP
after financial integration
128
Bibliography
Abreu, D., Pearce, D., and Stacchetti, E. (1990), “Toward a theory of discounted
repeated games with imperfect monitoring,” Econometrica, 58, 1041–1063.
Aggarwal, R. and Samwick, A. (1999), “The Other Side of the Trade-Off: The Impact
of Risk on Executive Compensation,” Journal of Political Economy, 107, 65–105.
Ai, H. and Li, R. (2013), “Investment and CEO Compensation under Limited Com-
mitment,” Working Paper. University of Minnesota and Purdue University.
Ai, H., Kiku, D., and Li, R. (2012), “A Mechanism Design Model of Firm Dynamics:
The Case of Limited Commitment,” Working Paper. University of Minnesota,
University of Pennsylvania, and Purdue University.
Albuquerque, R. and Hopenhayn, H. (2004), “Optimal lending contracts and firm
dynamics,” Review of Economic Studies, 71, 285–315.
Allen, F., Qian, M., and Qian, J. (2005), “Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in
China,” Journal of Financial Economics, 77, 57–116.
Alvarez, F. and Jermann, U. (2000), “Efficiency, equilibrium, and asset pricing with
risk of default,” Econometrica, 68, 775–797.
Angeletos, G.-M. and Panousi, V. (2011), “Financial integration, entrepreneurial risk
and global dynamics,” Journal of Economic Theory, 146, 863–896.
Atkeson, A. (1991), “International lending with moral hazard and risk of repudia-
tion,” Econometrica, 59, 1069–1089.
Atkeson, A., Eisfeldt, A., and Weill, P.-O. (2013), “Measuring the Financial Sound-
ness of US Firms 1926-2012,” Working paper. University of California-Los Angeles.
Axelson, U. and Baliga, S. (2009), “Liquidity and Manipulation of Executive Com-
pensation Schemes,” Review of Financial Studies, 22, 3907–3939.
Axelson, U. and Bond, P. (2012), “Wall Street occupations: An equilibrium theory
of overpaid jobs,” Working paper. London School of Economics and University of
Minnesota.
129
Ayyagari, M., Demirguc-Kunt, A., and Maksimovic, V. (2010), “Formal versus infor-
mal finance: Evidence from China,” Review of Financial Studies, 23, 3048–3097.
Bai, Y. and Zhang, J. (2010), “Solving the Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle with Financial
Frictions,” Econometrica, 78, 603–632.
Bai, Y. and Zhang, J. (2012), “Financial Integration and International Risk Sharing,”
Journal of International Economics, 86, 17–32.
Bayoumi, T., Tong, H., and Wei, S.-J. (2010), “Bonus culture: Competitive pay,
screening, and multitasking,” Working paper. NBER.
Bebchuk, L. A. and Fried, J. M. (2006), Pay without performance: The unfulfilled
promise of executive compensation, Harvard University Press.
Be´nabou, R. and Tirole, J. (2013), “Bonus culture: Competitive pay, screening,
and multitasking,” Working paper. Princeton University and Toulouse School of
Economics.
Bernanke, B. S. (2005), “The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account
Deficit,” Speech at the Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Assoc. Economists, Richmond,
VA.
Bernanke, B. S. (2007), “Global Imbalances: Recent Developments and Prospects,”
Speech at the Bundesbank Lecture, Berlin, Germany.
Bertrand, M. and Mullainathan, S. (2001), “Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The
Ones Without Principals Are,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 901–932.
Biais, B., Mariotti, T., Rochet, J.-C. R., and Villeneuve, S. (2010), “Large risks,
limited liability, and dynamic moral hazard,” Econometrica, 78, 73–118.
Bijlsma, M., Boone, J., and Zwart, G. (2012), “Competition for traders and risk,”
Working paper, Tilburg University.
Bloom, N. (2009), “The impact of uncertainty shocks,” Econometrica, 77, 623–685.
Bolton, P., Chen, H., and Wang, N. (2011), “A Unified Theory of Tobin’s q, Cor-
porate Investment, Financing, and Risk Management,” Journal of Finance, 66,
1545–1578.
Bolton, P., Chen, H., and Wang, N. (2013), “Market Timing, Investment, and Risk
Management,” Journal of Financial Economics, 109, 40–62.
Bond, P. and Glode, V. (2013), “Bankers and Regulators,” Working paper, University
of Washington and University of Pennsylvania.
130
Brunnermeier, M. and Sannikov, Y. (2012), “A Macroeconomic Model with a Finan-
cial Sector,” Working paper, Princeton University.
Buera, F., Kaboski, J., and Shin, Y. (2011), “Finance and Development: A Tale of
Two Sectors,” American Economic Review, 101, 1964–2002.
Bulow, J. and Rogoff, K. (1989), “Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?” Ameri-
can Economic Review, 79, 43–50.
Caballero, R. and Krishnamurthy, A. (2009), “Global Imbalances and Financial
Fragility,” Working Paper, NBER.
Caballero, R., Farhi, E., and Gourinchas, P.-O. (2008), “An Equilibrium Model of
”Global Imbalances” and Low Interest Rates,” American Economic Review, 98,
358–393.
Campello, M., Giambona, E., Graham, J., and Harvey, C. (2011), “Liquidity Man-
agement and Corporate Investment During a Financial Crisis,” Review of Financial
Studies, 24, 1944–1979.
Clementi, G. L. and Hopenhayn, H. (2006), “A theory of financing constraints and
firm dynamics,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121, 229–265.
Cooley, T., Marimon, R., and Quadrini, V. (2004), “Aggregate consequences of lim-
ited contract enforceability,” Journal of Political Economy, 112, 817–847.
Core, J. and Guay, W. (2002), “The Other Side of the Trade-off: The Impact of Risk
on Executive Compensation: A Revised Comment,” Working Paper, University of
Pennsylvania.
Cox, D. and Miller, H. (1977), The theory of stochastic processes, Chapman and Hall.
DeMarzo, P. and Fishman, M. (2007), “Optimal long-term financial contracting,”
Review of Financial Studies, 20, 2079–2128.
DeMarzo, P. and Sannikov, Y. (2006), “Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capi-
tal Structure in a Continuous-Time Agency Model,” Journal of Finance, 61, 2681–
2724.
DeMarzo, P., Fishman, M., He, Z., and Wang, N. (2012), “Dynamic Agency and the
Q Theory of Investment,” Journal of Finance, 67, 2295C2340.
Di Tella, S. (2013), “Uncertainty Shocks and Balance Sheet Recessions,” Working
paper. Stanford University.
Du, J., Lu, Y., and Tao, Z. (2012), “Contracting institutions and vertical integration:
Evidence from Chinas manufacturing firms,” Review of Financial Studies, 40, 89–
107.
131
Eisfeldt, A. and Kuhnen, C. (2013), “CEO Turnover in a Competitive Assignment
Framework,” Journal of Financial Economics, 109, 351–372.
Eisfeldt, A. and Rampini, A. (2006), “Capital Reallocation and Liquidity,” Journal
of Monetary Economics, 53, 369–399.
Ferguson, N. and Schularick, M. (2007), ““Chimerica” and the Global Asset Market
Boom,” International Finance, 10, 215–239.
Fong, Y.-f. and Li, J. (2012), “Relational Contracts, Efficiency Wages, and Employ-
ment Dynamics,” Working paper. HKUST and Northwestern University.
Frydman, C. and Jenter, D. (2010), “CEO Compensation,” Annual Review of Fi-
nancial Economics, 2, 75–102.
Glindro, E., Subhanij, T., Szeto, J., and Zhu, H. (2007), “Are Asia-Pacific Housing
Prices Too High For Comfort?” Working Paper, Bank of International Settlements.
Glode, V. and Lowery, R. (2013), “Informed Trading and High Compensation in
Finance,” Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania and University of Texas-
Austin.
Glode, V., Green, R. C., and Lowery, R. (2012), “Financial Expertise as an Arms
Race,” Journal of Finance, 67, 1723–1759.
Gochoco-Bautista, M. S. (2008), “Asset Prices and Monetary Policy: Booms and
Fat Tails in East Asia,” Working Paper, Bank of International Settlements.
Gourinchas, P.-O. and Jeanne, O. (2013), “Capital Flows to Developing Countries:
The Allocation Puzzle,” Review of Economic Studies, 80, 1484–1515.
Grochulski, B. and Zhang, Y. (2011), “Optimal risk sharing and borrowing con-
straints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 146, 2356–2388.
Grochulski, B. and Zhang, Y. (2013), “Market-based incentives,” Working paper.
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond and University of Texas-Austin.
He, Z. (2009), “Optimal executive compensation when firm size follows geometric
brownian motion,” Review of Financial Studies, 22, 859–892.
He, Z. and Krishnamurthy, A. (2013a), “Intermediary Asset Pricing,” American
Economic Review, 103, 732–770.
He, Z. and Krishnamurthy, A. (2013b), “A Macroeconomic Framework for Quan-
tifying Systemic Risk,” Working Paper, University of Chicago and Northwestern
University.
132
He, Z. and Xiong, W. (2012), “Rollover Risk and Credit Risk,” Journal of Finance,
67, 391–430.
Hoffmann, F. and Pfeil, S. (2010), “Reward for Luck in a Dynamic Agency Model,”
Review of Financial Studies, 23, 3329–3345.
Holmstrom, B. (1982), “Moral Hazard in Teams,” Bell Journal of Economics, 13,
324–340.
Holmstrom, B. and Milgrom, P. (1987), “Aggregation and linearity in the provision
of intertemporal incentives,” Econometrica, 55, 303–328.
Hsieh, C.-T. and Klenow, P. (2009), “Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China
and India,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124, 1403–1448.
Igan, D. and Jin, H. (2010), “Asian Real Estate Markets: On Bubble Alert?” Global
Financial Stability Report, International Monetary Fund.
IMF (2007), “Global Capital Flows: Defying Gravity, Finance and Developement,”
.
Jenter, D. and Kanaan, F. (2010), “CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Eval-
uation,” Working paper. Stanford University.
Kaplan, S. (2012), “Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in the U.S.:
Perceptions, Facts and Challenges,” Working paper. University of Chicago.
Kaplan, S. and Minton, B. (2012), “How Has CEO Turnover Changed,” International
Review of Finance, 12, 57–87.
Kaplan, S. and Rauh, J. (2010), “Wall Street and Main Street: What contributes to
the rise in the highest incomes,” Review of Financial Studies, 23, 1004–1050.
Kehoe, P. and Perri, F. (2002), “International business cycles with endogenous in-
complete markets,” Econometrica, 70, 907–928.
Kehoe, T. and Levine, D. (1993), “Debt-constrained asset markets,” Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 60, 865–888.
Kiyotaki, N. and Moore, J. (1997), “Credit Cycles,” Journal of Political Economy,
105, 211–248.
Kramer, C. (2006), “Asia’s Investment Puzzle,” Working Paper, International Mon-
etary Fund.
Krishnamurthy, A. (2003), “Collateral Constraints and the Amplification Mechanis-
m,” Journal of Economic Theory, 111, 277–292.
133
La Porta, R., Lopez-de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1997), “Legal De-
terminants of External Finance,” Journal of Finance, 52, 1131–1150.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1998), “Law and
Finance,” Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1113–1155.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (2000), “Investor
Protection and Corporate Governance,” Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 3–
27.
Lambert, R. and Larcker, D. (1987), “An analysis of the use of accounting and
market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts,” Journal of
Accounting Research, 25, 85–125.
Leland, H. E. (1994), “Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital
Structure,” Journal of Finance, 49, 1213–1252.
Leland, H. E. and Toft, K. B. (1996), “Optimal Capital Structure, Endogenous
Bankruptcy, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads,” Journal of Finance, 51,
987–1019.
Levin, J. (2003), “Relational Incentive Contracts,” American Economic Review, 93,
835–857.
Li, R. (2012), “Optimal Contract Design over the Business Cycle,” Working paper,
Purdue University.
Lorenzoni, G. (2008), “Inefficient Credit Booms,” Review of Economic Studies, 75,
809–833.
Lu, Y. and Tao, Z. (2009), “Contract enforcement and family control of business:
Evidence from China,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 37, 597–609.
Ma, G. and Yi, W. (2010), “China’s High Saving Rate: Myth and Reality,” Working
Paper, Bank for International Settlements.
Maggiori, M. (2012), “Financial Intermediation, International Risk Sharing, and
Reserve Currencies,” Working Paper, New York University.
Mendoza, E., Quadrini, V., and Rios-Rull, J.-V. (2009), “Financial Integration, Fi-
nancial Development, and Global Imbalances,” Journal of Political Economy, 117,
371–416.
Miao, J. and Zhang, Y. (2013), “A Duality Approach to Continuous-Time Contract-
ing Problems with Limited Commitment,” Working paper, Boston University and
University of Texas-Austin.
134
Midrigan, V. and Xu, D. Y. (2011), “Finance and Misallocation: Evidence from
Plant-level Data,” Working paper, NBER.
Moll, B. (2013), “Productivity Losses from Financial Frictions: Can Self-financing
Undo Capital Misallocation?” Working paper, Princeton University.
Opp, M. and Zhu, J. (2013), “Impatience vs. Incentives,” Working paper, University
of California-Berkeley and University of Pennsylvania.
Oyer, P. (2008), “The making of an investment banker: Stock market shocks, career
choice, and lifetime income,” Journal of Finance, 63, 2601–2628.
Peters, F. and Wagner, A. (2013), “The Executive Turnover Risk Premium,” Journal
of Finance, forthcoming.
Philippon, T. and Reshef, A. (2012), “Wages and Human Capital in the US Finance
Industry: 1909C2006,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127, 1551–1609.
Piskorski, T. and Tchistyi, A. (2010), “Optimal mortgage design,” Review of Finan-
cial Studies, 23, 3098–3140.
Prendergast, C. (2002), “The Tenuous Trade-off between Risk and Incentives,” Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 110, 1071–1102.
Rajan, R. G. (2006a), “Investment Restraint, the Liquidity Glut, and Global Imbal-
ances,” Remarks at the Conference on Global Imbalances, Bali.
Rajan, R. G. (2006b), “Is There a Global Shortage of Fixed Assets?” Remarks at
the G-30 Meetings in New York City.
Rampini, A. and Viswanathan, S. (2013a), “Collateral and capital structure,” Jour-
nal of Financial Economics, 109, 466–492.
Rampini, A. and Viswanathan, S. (2013b), “Collateral, Risk Management, and the
Distribution of Debt,” Journal of Finance, 65, 2293–2322.
Ray, D. (2002), “The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements,” Econometrica,
70, 547–582.
Sannikov, Y. (2008), “A continuous-time version of the principal-agent problem,”
Review of Economic Studies, 75, 957–984.
Schwarz, W. (1992), “The Wiener Process between a Reflecting and an Absorbing
Barrier,” Journal of Applied Probability, 65, 597–604.
Song, Z., Storesletten, K., and Zilibotti, F. (2012), “Growing Like China,” American
Economic Review, 101, 196–233.
135
Spear, S. and Srivastava, S. (1987), “On repeated moral hazard with discounting,”
Review of Economic Studies, 54, 599–617.
Thanassoulis, J. (2012), “The case for intervening in bankers’ pay,” Journal of Fi-
nance, 67, 849–895.
Thomas, J. and Worrall, T. (1988), “Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts,” Review of
Economic Studies, 61, 541–554.
Thomas, J. and Worrall, T. (1994), “Foreign direct investment and the risk of ex-
propriation,” Review of Economic Studies, 61, 81–108.
Ward, A. and Glynn, P. (2003), “Properties of the Reflected Ornstein–Uhlenbeck
Process,” Queueing Systems, 44, 109–123.
Wu, J., Gyourko, J., and Deng, Y. (2012), “Evaluating conditions in major Chinese
housing markets,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 42, 531–543.
Yang, D. T., Zhang, J., and Zhou, S. (2010), “Why are Saving Rates so High in
China,” Working Paper, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
Zhang, L. and Du, Z. (2010), “On the Reflected Geometric Brownian Motion with
Two Barriers,” Intelligent Information Management, 2, 295–298.
Zhu, J. Y. (2013), “Optimal Contracts with Shirking,” Review of Economic Studies,
80, 812–839.
136
Biography
Felix Zhiyu Feng (born on September 28th, 1984, in Chengdu, China) is a Doctor of
Philosophy candidate in economics at Duke University. He holds a B.A in economics
and finance from Peking University, China in 2007, and a M.A. in economics from
Duke University in 2008. His Ph.D. work focuses on theoretical corporate finance,
especially in the areas of corporate governance and investments. He received the
Tsang Hin-Chi Undergraduate Scholarship in 2004, the Distinguished Undergraduate
Thesis Award in 2007, the Fooster-Comes Research Fellowship in 2013, and the
Duke University Graduate School Fellowship from 2009 to 2014. He will join the
Department of Economics at the University of Notre Dame as an assistant professor
in August, 2014.
137
